Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b8319a10c24a79a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

408.6 KB Created: 2020-06-09 12:34:00
MD5: efcc35fd090adcb50be73642fbebb80b SHA-1: 7f61ebde51cc5baad19b1606ac26d772ee1e74ce SHA-256: 6b8319a10c24a79aaf8ff125ba566e01c9f5cbbd5c2c5d7686760a838bc2fcb2
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-8759, which are known to drop and execute scripts. The presence of OLE object data and composite monikers strongly suggests that the file is designed to leverage these vulnerabilities to execute a malicious payload. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 8

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/w

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000132c1.bin
1788855481799e83cbc5d6749fcb6cc7ab235b17f91727641d051fdb13fc70a2		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x132C1 59595 bytes
objdata_01_off00019a70.bin
9c69bdcaac9c178264e88ebc5ef45dce055806e7282d4eb1ce0e22cad303ff64		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19A70 59568 bytes
objdata_02_off00037f0f.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x37F0F 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off000394b2.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x394B2 12297 bytes

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