MALICIOUS
282
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is an RTF document that leverages multiple critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-8759) related to OLE object activation and composite monikers. These vulnerabilities are known to facilitate the execution of arbitrary code, typically by dropping and running a script like SCT. The document body content appears to be garbled or malformed, providing no clear user-facing lure, but the presence of these specific CVEs strongly indicates an exploit attempt. The benign URL found is irrelevant to the exploit mechanism.
Heuristics 8
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Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE_2017_8570RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
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CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/w
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off000132c1.bin5f667762fe1eeca0e2c1ce55a3c66d7d1a9177cfc6fba58a4358c47ee451d9f1 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x132C1 | 56433 bytes |
objdata_01_off00019a70.bin8590326df6a49cb353ce71093e7109e4cc75efc30997d88b34d468ba2ae62c63 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x19A70 | 56406 bytes |
objdata_02_off0003655d.bina8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x3655D | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off00037b00.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x37B00 | 12297 bytes |
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