MALICIOUS
282
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically referencing CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-8759, which are known to facilitate arbitrary code execution. The presence of OLE object data and composite monikers strongly suggests that the file is designed to exploit these vulnerabilities to drop and execute a secondary payload. The document body content appears to be garbled or malformed, providing no clear user-facing lure.
Heuristics 8
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Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE_2017_8570RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
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CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/w
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off000132c1.bin69cacba5797d82e67ff87b2dc9a8be13a91217de8ecc8d0753578b20d06869d3 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x132C1 | 221081 bytes |
objdata_01_off00019a70.binfb118cbde7d9eaf00c6270f1300159b51fe9fa71eaf44aa04f579253840658f0 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x19A70 | 221054 bytes |
objdata_02_off00089f21.bin51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x89F21 | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off0008b4c4.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B4C4 | 12297 bytes |
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