Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 787ea1dbb0b03d64…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.02 MB First seen: 2026-05-25
MD5: ee9778dda2890792b7d5af77946a9436 SHA-1: bdfec5e23d7ca0a12ca5347c644ea80fe21b2e00 SHA-256: 787ea1dbb0b03d6454f97c437513294260d4300e0d787745bda191318add10b7
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object embedding, specifically leveraging CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-0199/CVE-2017-8759. The presence of ".objdata" sections with excessive hex data and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest the embedding of a payload designed to be automatically activated. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable Editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and allow the embedded exploit to run. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing attachment, leading to client execution via the exploited vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bad.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAD 408272 bytes
SHA-256: 6f5a5424592cfebe5def5ecfe375648b29accbc77addd20596e72a3bea16475a
objdata_01_off0000735c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735C 408245 bytes
SHA-256: d448c36c527195c63f3568d6abcb1d66b64721842b5a19d2fef16de9770a687c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000d68fb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD68FB 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off000d7e9e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7E9E 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7

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