Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 787ea1dbb0b03d64…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.02 MB
MD5: ee9778dda2890792b7d5af77946a9436 SHA-1: bdfec5e23d7ca0a12ca5347c644ea80fe21b2e00 SHA-256: 787ea1dbb0b03d6454f97c437513294260d4300e0d787745bda191318add10b7
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects and triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-8570, which is known to drop SCT scripts. The document body includes a common lure to 'Enable Editing' to bypass security measures. The embedded OLE data is substantial, suggesting it hides a payload. The primary attack vector is likely exploitation of CVE-2017-8570 for client execution, delivered via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 8

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bad.bin
6f5a5424592cfebe5def5ecfe375648b29accbc77addd20596e72a3bea16475a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAD 408272 bytes
objdata_01_off0000735c.bin
d448c36c527195c63f3568d6abcb1d66b64721842b5a19d2fef16de9770a687c		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735C 408245 bytes
objdata_02_off000d68fb.bin
51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD68FB 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off000d7e9e.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7E9E 12297 bytes

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