MALICIOUS
520
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a secondary PDF, indicating a multi-stage attack. The critical CVE-2009-4324 heuristic suggests exploitation of a known vulnerability in PDF readers, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection of 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-30101' further confirms its malicious nature. The embedded URL, while benign, is part of the document's structure.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9816
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIAPDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADERAn embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-30101 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-30101
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c"); -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIAPDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/paperindex.htmPDF link annotation
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript
Extracted artifacts 8
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
stream_002_off00000392.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 | 4264 bytes |
SHA-256: ed9369f3625f936facbf25374ffe8ac90fd83b57da7fb14dcc93f323111abdff |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 | 126 bytes |
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */ |
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objstm_0017_00.bin |
pdf-objstm-decoded | PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) | 871 bytes |
SHA-256: dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84 |
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font_00_sfnt_off0001779e.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1779E | 106404 bytes |
SHA-256: df3d2282e5f0b9e4a03e4e4187b97117c35603a241152ddeb6696758ec9e4090 |
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font_01_sfnt_off00026476.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x26476 | 52436 bytes |
SHA-256: dfccc2ae90717e5f2f133b5a41976ae6481f0f41f56ece66d6a8d76030e60eec |
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font_02_sfnt_off0002c582.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2C582 | 48092 bytes |
SHA-256: 82d893b80bac0fefbc396713a48a479132ea011c23c20359b627a8c7161a6c13 |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off00013e7f.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x13E7F | 128911 bytes |
SHA-256: be03c2ab7cc83523c46036acb1d7830e208c8142630b0b8ef39f9ab8238a0f0e |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off00031e21.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x31E21 | 6125 bytes |
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8 |
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