MALICIOUS
518
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324, specifically targeting the media.newPlayer API. The exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0' ClamAV detection and the presence of an embedded, suspicious secondary PDF. The obfuscated JavaScript and the use of string concatenation to hide API calls are common techniques for dropper malware.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9543
Heuristics 13
-
Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIAPDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
-
media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
-
Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADERAn embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
-
ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0
-
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
-
JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
-
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c"); -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
-
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIAPDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
-
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
-
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript
Extracted artifacts 8
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
stream_002_off00000392.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 | 4070 bytes |
SHA-256: eb92f1132871ae0fddf20e5ee26a623d43701f745935a070d5370dc5024d51cb |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
|
|||
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 | 126 bytes |
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74 |
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */ |
|||
objstm_0017_00.bin |
pdf-objstm-decoded | PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) | 871 bytes |
SHA-256: dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84 |
|||
font_00_sfnt_off000285e3.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x285E3 | 108424 bytes |
SHA-256: 1fe1849fd088a648ec207afb8286940bf8146dca8af878a82215c65d384ce87b |
|||
font_01_sfnt_off000377da.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x377DA | 51792 bytes |
SHA-256: 002b636d32483203401744d2639294a3ace3c55cfaf468db37fb2400f977ae39 |
|||
font_02_sfnt_off0003d7c1.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3D7C1 | 21396 bytes |
SHA-256: 8c7780e13a82162e9255f02209f125f57c044f111aa8a0ddd34f7a00aa655d14 |
|||
polyglot_child_pdf_off00017c7f.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x17C7F | 173502 bytes |
SHA-256: 830855869923a73709a8ea90148c5edb21965cecf57e6b604c0e5d8e3317652f |
|||
polyglot_child_pdf_off00040a50.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x40A50 | 6125 bytes |
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8 |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.