Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd4deed862ab102e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

264.6 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 2.2) First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 949265ee1d3e587152a23311a85b3be9 SHA-1: dbe83ac7ca51128f77e39f426dceadc73dba3f01 SHA-256: cd4deed862ab102e7fbccc85ee87b09fbb3e6374b51b99f97c904abd4b590f01
518 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324, specifically targeting the media.newPlayer API. The exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0' ClamAV detection and the presence of an embedded, suspicious secondary PDF. The obfuscated JavaScript and the use of string concatenation to hide API calls are common techniques for dropper malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9543

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical CVE related PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADER
    An embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-5303061-0
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
     var nop =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000392.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 4070 bytes
SHA-256: eb92f1132871ae0fddf20e5ee26a623d43701f745935a070d5370dc5024d51cb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0017_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
SHA-256: dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84
font_00_sfnt_off000285e3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x285E3 108424 bytes
SHA-256: 1fe1849fd088a648ec207afb8286940bf8146dca8af878a82215c65d384ce87b
font_01_sfnt_off000377da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x377DA 51792 bytes
SHA-256: 002b636d32483203401744d2639294a3ace3c55cfaf468db37fb2400f977ae39
font_02_sfnt_off0003d7c1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3D7C1 21396 bytes
SHA-256: 8c7780e13a82162e9255f02209f125f57c044f111aa8a0ddd34f7a00aa655d14
polyglot_child_pdf_off00017c7f.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x17C7F 173502 bytes
SHA-256: 830855869923a73709a8ea90148c5edb21965cecf57e6b604c0e5d8e3317652f
polyglot_child_pdf_off00040a50.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x40A50 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8