Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 15

• Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
• Adobe Flash/authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2009-1862 critical CVE likely CVE_2009_1862_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an embedded SWF, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This matches the 2009 authplay.dll Flash-in-PDF exploit delivery shape even when the SWF bytecode does not expose stable printable Run_Sploit markers.
• Adobe Reader authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-3654 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_3654_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an ActionScript 3 SWF containing DoABC/SymbolClass code with URLRequest or StagePlayer/ByteArray/loadBytes markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-3654 Adobe Reader/Acrobat authplay Flash handling.
• media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
  PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
• Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical CVE related PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADER
  An embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  Matched line in script

   var nop =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");

• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
  PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
• PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
  PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html In PDF document text

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn PDF document text

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