Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68ac65c0c3b134e7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

203.4 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)
MD5: bfa3e31d5329fb44e310879de12c316e SHA-1: 181ed664e0b2fdc1ffbddea2bd51043ae93f49d3 SHA-256: 68ac65c0c3b134e7ca88c11fbd101b5a7950c1e65f272521f664dcfdac1e99a4
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the media.newPlayer function, a known indicator for the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage malicious payload. The presence of multiple PDF-specific exploit heuristics and ML classification strongly indicates malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000392.bin
14d23c5f365998927117ed395a977061aa75349fbd75055dbd32b39dda42e480		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 4264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74		 deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 126 bytes
objstm_0017_00.bin
dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0002a3aa.bin
bcaf6e833ad0638d3e8e9908eb66e68a3bc2efa8394accdc04ea7b114afb78d1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2A3AA 44760 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002568b.pdf
15bfcf7b4a03c79286db9d794859b8b2526a1c97f101fd5fae621ca6e94ddea3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2568B 55039 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003159d.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x3159D 6125 bytes

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