Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a6a2814ee661a9e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

182.7 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)
MD5: 649108a459c37271f512a07214c8edb0 SHA-1: f712f804a1694bac0f4171e813f7615512831b5a SHA-256: a6a2814ee661a9e8a206082b1b7a778402128b3d8aa4aecbaef934de56a740b2
246 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324, indicated by the 'media.newPlayer' heuristic. This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of an embedded PDF and JavaScript streams further supports this attack vector. The document body is unreadable, but the heuristics strongly suggest a malicious exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 10

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000392.bin
ad463488e4cf9c0da10d02c948cd890385be1cbaeae9a6fe347391e1f406652f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 4264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74		 deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 126 bytes
objstm_0017_00.bin
dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00029064.bin
43c2d508e34d2522e221ccf54487565d1670a6cfd1432c9132b784514431b1ad		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x29064 22924 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002569b.pdf
dcb2f3719b98beb186643f9c931f421e309b03a6d7b7d98bc8563f0d714708e0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2569B 33865 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002c2f7.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2C2F7 6125 bytes

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