Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d16a01c07aee4eba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

352.0 KB Created: 2009-10-13 16:35:14 -05:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: d6b23cf78c9592cf395c7659ae6c5b43 SHA-1: 85fc2effdfdb38a7533079ab6afa6187ce55b4f2 SHA-256: d16a01c07aee4eba758c97faece50af84601d2663b7043d668fed0296585c36c
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to drop and execute an embedded Windows executable disguised as 'Reglamento_de_Trabajo.pdf'. The embedded executable is renamed to 'Reglamento_de_Trabajo.exe' and then launched. This behavior is indicative of a dropper or downloader, likely exploiting CVE-2010-1240 for execution. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\Reglamento_de_Trabajo.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://172.20.0.194:4444 In extracted file (Reglamento_de_Trabajo.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (stream_023_off000408bc.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (stream_023_off000408bc.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off000477e6.bin)

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Reglamento_de_Trabajo.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 127 at offset 0x52DDE 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 4cd68ffb41cae1735566d580ec3f1775a7ad8227f0a0925b706a00a35c99753b
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Reglamento_de_Trabajo.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 172.20.0.194:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0128_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 128 at offset 0x57ACA 70 bytes
SHA-256: 25eaf2b80b1da3e37e039d0541f1c2c5e4cb36a7ca6d6f7c881290994678a55f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Reglamento_de_Trabajo", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_023_off000408bc.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x408BC 46312 bytes
SHA-256: a30a2bd1e6181309fe4faab81c395f2479a225a5012152abf71938519ec22f69
font_00_sfnt_off00039ce7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x39CE7 8004 bytes
SHA-256: c37537d14a8fc951e1eff2a648ddd3229647f4370dbf59954fa98abe3f8db859
font_01_sfnt_off0003b40f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3B40F 35928 bytes
SHA-256: e3d9f6241cd1b2854f832e43f859452e9cf74eb08854b180737ff598a536fc67
font_03_sfnt_off000477e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x477E6 44552 bytes
SHA-256: 0aa1460280bbcdec1601db33ed86603bffcf6b55781bffeb610c4081b9ad30b5
font_04_sfnt_off0004e1b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4E1B4 7940 bytes
SHA-256: 3b6363d370a45dcd4f9fee3b69e1d7f7c6efe1ba5e8ee43d153048728ef0225e