Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b59e904b9f04d7a0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.9 KB Created: 2010-04-19 11:21:03 -04:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: eb67ef378d7cd51cb233ebeab174540f SHA-1: 2f006be29f856babcd8e4fe18bae7b3af41456fd SHA-256: b59e904b9f04d7a01ce32e41b14faf4004cbb2803e5bc5a3257894dbd5eff891
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. Critical heuristics indicate a launch action targeting cmd.exe and an embedded PE payload disguised as a PDF file. This payload is likely a Metasploit stager, as suggested by static triage signals and ClamAV detection of a reverse TCP shell.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: Cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\FilmReview.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://10.0.0.11:443 In extracted file (FilmReview.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001011.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001011.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00003cfa.bin)
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 4c3a3d54ac 3 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
FilmReview.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 27 at offset 0xB5D0 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 4c3a3d54accc80558da7977e88e0a5add2ff85e5f1e8dd69943ef83a441f3ece
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=FilmReview.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 10.0.0.11:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
javascript_obj0028_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 28 at offset 0x1037A 59 bytes
SHA-256: fc8e7ee98042ceb50301c0b60920dedc9a4e52cd009e9fb9d985df4313ed9165
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "FilmReview", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00001011.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1011 22852 bytes
SHA-256: 55166454225ea3d96879e63c92f157bb102fed83b43a1469db8ea4b980073556
font_01_sfnt_off00003cfa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3CFA 44640 bytes
SHA-256: 9271764f363a4b8f4a83dc3c1bebc351b0ced246a6561382f7f64c4fa093f8b4

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