Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 911c515fb62d3c71…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.4 KB Created: 2010-05-18 06:04:38 +02:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 2839c540ea0ff3be905c17d49a4e263b SHA-1: ba7e92e66d8f70d302578f3b81db4b4d35b5d1e6 SHA-256: 911c515fb62d3c7178022b43cd89a06cb7d96e2e0fce5d42b6dbdcbdccd949f7
596 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a PE payload, triggering critical heuristics for PDF launch actions and embedded executable payloads. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic indicates a known vulnerability is being exploited to launch cmd.exe. The embedded artifact was detected as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131 by ClamAV, suggesting it is a secondary payload. The PDF's structure and heuristics strongly indicate a malicious intent to exploit the reader and download further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\se-in.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 58 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.0.14:4444 In extracted file (se-in.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002479.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002479.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00004f2d.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
se-in.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 23 at offset 0x9943 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 9bfb6a3922d4fbac29b6adfd02baa8c4b2ca4a0a674aa36831fd3e254cf731f1
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=se-in.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.14:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0024_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 24 at offset 0xE60F 54 bytes
SHA-256: bb728463b0d35dabcca9bcc71d5f786a6b9a2021cc2d5e00263b223cb25b9b55
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "se-in", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00002479.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2479 20960 bytes
SHA-256: d859976511a68a0a169809db6dc928b946731fbbd7676bf7ea3d0d9b3fccc822
font_01_sfnt_off00004f2d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4F2D 29760 bytes
SHA-256: 54f6a50d18ba607328a558702befc3092942ebe2485c96226a1b26b0bbc80320

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.