Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39c02307bd03129f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

270.1 KB Created: 2010-05-27 22:13:33 -04:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 26675bbd503f05fc767508ed56dac235 SHA-1: 3f3b11d14097a4adf89b10f98031229cd55eb4bf SHA-256: 39c02307bd03129f58c57f6372e89624beccacc5b8fa53d188c68e55f92069f6
638 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action targeting cmd.exe to execute a payload. The embedded executable payload and the heuristic 'SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE' strongly suggest the document is designed to trick the user into a financial scam. The embedded JavaScript and the PDF launch action indicate the primary goal is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\handbook.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Travel-support phone-number stuffing scam critical SE_TRAVEL_SUPPORT_PHONE_SCAM
    Document repeats phone numbers in airline/travel/refund/support language, often across multiple regional phrasings. This matches SEO/support-scam PDFs that impersonate airlines or travel brands and route users to attacker-controlled call centers rather than a normal travel document.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.suntrust.com/retirementsolutions In PDF document text
    • http://www.discoverybenefits.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.cignabehavioral.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.cign.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.teldrug.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.mycigna.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.lifebenefits.com/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netFontsIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0001acc6.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_05_sfnt_off00029adf.bin)
    • http://www.netbenefits.fidelity.com/PDF link annotation
    • http://www.unum.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.eyemedvisioncare.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.kaiserpermanente.org/In PDF document text
    • http://www.cigna.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.CIGNA.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.cigna.com/healthyrewardsIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseDejaVuIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0001acc6.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_couriernew.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_05_sfnt_off00029adf.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_06_sfnt_off0002ba18.bin)

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
handbook.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 273 at offset 0x3E530 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 46654ef89d0a22bf10dc6d88ddb928f7352207a4d345cc1980ac5fb9b9e162c6
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Exploit.Countdown-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=handbook.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0274_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 274 at offset 0x4341B 57 bytes
SHA-256: ff55c3569615905a49995e011f58a5f14b9bcd78f90366bfed8a0a3717ddaa0c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "handbook", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0001a690.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A690 1752 bytes
SHA-256: 9fcdb1b7a215e5430ae526254077873a5f66f34e5546831704f970cbc3fe3f17
font_01_sfnt_off0001acc6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1ACC6 33568 bytes
SHA-256: 1595e16a4f9a0296195e8dc1865868585c10d52861edb7be5bd8d7bb46db92b6
font_02_sfnt_off0001f5e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F5E7 27004 bytes
SHA-256: 34b0487b9d5db5448761716fd39edac50b029d9a55416c4f3c80a2767672c1b9
font_03_sfnt_off0002290d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2290D 31960 bytes
SHA-256: daebbe6f5b3bb39df11cac5456a4dd34995b98a47d83eea0b3f52e995dd61225
font_04_sfnt_off00026c0c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x26C0C 25516 bytes
SHA-256: 84c02ed1e82014a67a7bc68df43de9ea2cab3e3cffaf559b8eb8f98dc2c1ba23
font_05_sfnt_off00029adf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x29ADF 16476 bytes
SHA-256: 4027f6d872dc004d25fac9306111c00201f60500e4898dfe0941d608ccc2a3e6
font_06_sfnt_off0002ba18.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2BA18 46720 bytes
SHA-256: 5d3b487106b60ccd273e9fbbc201f0d7bba5eba88fc208da91f96864df8478f7
font_07_sfnt_off00033197.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33197 21924 bytes
SHA-256: 3a6f2930bb6cbd05763fa470b4e32e0c20dcc3efa4d1c4d37d1e60fd340f4b67