Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ce68538298375837…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.9 KB Created: 2007-03-14 18:51:51 -04:00 Authoring application: Firefox (via Mac OS X 10.4.9 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 892a764548feb40df06911c3bf09dba2 SHA-1: 2886616d2c0ed1c73b0168a34148019236243b7e SHA-256: ce68538298375837c7f017a633cf1637d515c68dccbfdc978f6df8d41fa37fc0
476 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe. The critical heuristic PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND indicates that cmd.exe is executed with parameters designed to potentially execute a dropped payload. Furthermore, a critical heuristic PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD identifies an embedded Windows executable disguised as a PDF file named '00001.pdf'. The combination of these factors strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit a PDF vulnerability to execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\00001.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://nopsr.us/ctf2006prequal/ In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
00001.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x86A8 69120 bytes
SHA-256: 865f34fe7ba81e9622ddbdfc511547d190367bbf3dad21ceb6da3eec621044f5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=00001.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0029_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 29 at offset 0x10F8A 54 bytes
SHA-256: c906b7b2cb915d4e64018b9c3ddb8ef1223afa08bd5daf0676a6ff7e0e96a4ac
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "00001", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000029fb.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29FB 1320 bytes
SHA-256: eb03db58ff1f226c83103a11f30b5520f9b68a7ced67daa78992723e3ea0411d
font_00_sfnt_off00002de4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2DE4 8420 bytes
SHA-256: 12631de56f734003216fec20b9df9f25602f9d938f913c4f03f5e87a1d2bb3d9
font_01_sfnt_off00004669.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4669 21572 bytes
SHA-256: a68f517baa90c8f001a07e1fbbbc2c9132b68edf8899c6c6467cce85420a90a4

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