Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 12

• Adobe Reader Launch/export embedded executable chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_EMBEDDED_PE_EXPORT
  PDF combines a /Launch action with an embedded-file name tree, exportDataObject JavaScript, and embedded executable bytes. This matches the CVE-2010-1240 Launch-file abuse chain even when the Launch dictionary does not expose the stricter cmd.exe /Win shape.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://nopsr.us/ctf2006prequal/ In PDF document text

  • http://ocsp.verisign.com0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/exportingIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://www.sysinternals.comIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpaIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0DIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftCodeVerifRoot.crl0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (00001.pdf)
  • http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternalsIn extracted file (00001.pdf)

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