Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e8ee1a6796be3c0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

133.6 KB Created: 2007-03-14 18:51:51 -04:00 Authoring application: Firefox (via Mac OS X 10.4.9 Quartz PDFContext)
MD5: 587d7e6b564c1c0b4346afc7fc36c08e SHA-1: 345f6f3809709008218a62da53b9f5abb29ebc5e SHA-256: 0e8ee1a6796be3c07c4dfacd55a944c3bd4fecc98357a24306fd1c1324b7f71b
456 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This action is paired with an embedded executable payload disguised as a PDF document, indicating an attempt to deliver and execute malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch/export embedded executable chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_EMBEDDED_PE_EXPORT
    PDF combines a /Launch action with an embedded-file name tree, exportDataObject JavaScript, and embedded executable bytes. This matches the CVE-2010-1240 Launch-file abuse chain even when the Launch dictionary does not expose the stricter cmd.exe /Win shape.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://nopsr.us/ctf2006prequal/
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/exporting
    • http://www.sysinternals.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0
    • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftCodeVerifRoot.crl0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0
    • http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternals

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
00001.pdf
5ad240fbbaf7bd0484a90a89e2f1190fc377e5af0f218b313c0d3ad756cb7327		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x86AB 198504 bytes
javascript_obj0029_000.js
c906b7b2cb915d4e64018b9c3ddb8ef1223afa08bd5daf0676a6ff7e0e96a4ac		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 29 at offset 0x213EC 54 bytes
icc_00_off000029fb.icc
eb03db58ff1f226c83103a11f30b5520f9b68a7ced67daa78992723e3ea0411d		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29FB 1320 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00004669.bin
a68f517baa90c8f001a07e1fbbbc2c9132b68edf8899c6c6467cce85420a90a4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4669 21572 bytes

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