MALICIOUS
180
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing indicating an embedded Windows executable payload. This payload is disguised as a PDF document, which is a common technique for delivering malware. The embedded artifact is named '00001.pdf', suggesting a potential attempt to trick users into opening it. No scripts were extracted, but the embedded PE payload is the primary indicator of malicious intent.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9159
Heuristics 5
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://nopsr.us/ctf2006prequal/ In PDF document text
- http://ocsp.verisign.com0In PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/exportingIn PDF document text
- http://www.sysinternals.comIn PDF document text
- https://www.verisign.com/rpaIn PDF document text
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa01In PDF document text
- http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0In PDF document text
- http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0DIn PDF document text
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa0In PDF document text
- http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0In PDF document text
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftCodeVerifRoot.crl0In PDF document text
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In PDF document text
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In PDF document text
- http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternalsIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
00001.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x86AB | 198504 bytes |
SHA-256: 5ad240fbbaf7bd0484a90a89e2f1190fc377e5af0f218b313c0d3ad756cb7327 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=00001.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
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icc_00_off000029fb.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29FB | 1320 bytes |
SHA-256: eb03db58ff1f226c83103a11f30b5520f9b68a7ced67daa78992723e3ea0411d |
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font_00_sfnt_off00004669.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4669 | 21572 bytes |
SHA-256: a68f517baa90c8f001a07e1fbbbc2c9132b68edf8899c6c6467cce85420a90a4 |
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