Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1b196d45c591e3a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

133.5 KB Created: 2007-03-14 18:51:51 -04:00 Authoring application: Firefox (via Mac OS X 10.4.9 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 0ea7ee5e1fdb530cb5432ec935ee1c3f SHA-1: f8a46bab50a0bff77eadc50a94809ef1855d9a8b SHA-256: e1b196d45c591e3a3a3cc3739d2e6bef915c2216eb0996aab9409663f9e433b1
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a launch action targeting 'cmd.exe', indicating an attempt to execute a command-line process. Additionally, it embeds a Windows executable payload. This strongly suggests the document is designed to initiate a malicious process, likely for downloading and executing further malware. The ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9794

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://nopsr.us/ctf2006prequal/ In PDF document text
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/exportingIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sysinternals.comIn PDF document text
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpaIn PDF document text
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01In PDF document text
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0In PDF document text
    • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0DIn PDF document text
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0In PDF document text
    • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftCodeVerifRoot.crl0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternalsIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
00001.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 28 at offset 0x86AB 198504 bytes
SHA-256: 5ad240fbbaf7bd0484a90a89e2f1190fc377e5af0f218b313c0d3ad756cb7327
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=00001.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
icc_00_off000029fb.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29FB 1320 bytes
SHA-256: eb03db58ff1f226c83103a11f30b5520f9b68a7ced67daa78992723e3ea0411d
font_00_sfnt_off00004669.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4669 21572 bytes
SHA-256: a68f517baa90c8f001a07e1fbbbc2c9132b68edf8899c6c6467cce85420a90a4

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.