Malware Insights
This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute a command. Specifically, it targets cmd.exe with parameters that suggest it will change directories and potentially execute a dropped file. The PDF also contains a critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD firing, confirming an embedded Windows executable. The PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic further suggests that JavaScript is used to drop an attachment, which is likely the embedded PE payload. The embedded artifact 'High_Quality_Print.joboptions' is identified as a masqueraded executable. The combination of these findings strongly indicates a multi-stage attack where the PDF acts as a dropper for a malicious executable.
Heuristics 13
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
Extracted artifacts 9
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
High_Quality_Print.joboptions92c1099a336b70e5880354bb469740551af654515aa5d5c09de8ad1b8f33cf14 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 23 at offset 0x2F310 | 15773 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 13 long base64-like blob(s).
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pdf24b89d24ae9ae1e0db2c21abfd0165b46aeb6fdc0f2dd7005e9256ac2059e326 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 1357 at offset 0xA8C1E | 73802 bytes |
javascript_obj1358_000.js135d8ff085921b81e04dc360543078fa4091eb102c6c0edfa69b9c2e8675d290 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 1358 at offset 0xB38B2 | 49 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off0001a6bc.bin22948cd0118f1a0cb1ebd69d760e67388d8a3b1aafaafb02bc628bb5bbe2cf80 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A6BC | 31116 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off0002b732.binbe6c6f3c13a02aa1424c956fc9f7bd093740c18ffe600f42587d605893a61658 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2B732 | 11040 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off000699bd.bine444436c8e13d30d86353f4c6704a5627bb2245ed8a1dc1ba55722099afaed82 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x699BD | 31448 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off0006d586.bind1c16a656ed769347aba28cd2496c8a38253bc120122208babc57d5ef90f1d0f |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D586 | 31116 bytes |
font_04_sfnt_off0007101e.bin0817ed3117be00d43776a2e85f8a72b277a78d4b1a895658fe2e313256a87e11 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7101E | 51880 bytes |
font_05_sfnt_off00078874.bin06713d7023efbea532d1391da338d5561dd0a320fa5db1cbccbf4f67307a2e6c |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78874 | 62384 bytes |
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