Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 14

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
  PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript

  • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (pdf)
  • tcp://89.142.86.40:31337In extracted file (pdf)
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpaIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000347b.bin)
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000347b.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000347b.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000347b.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000347b.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/RPA0In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.comIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0�In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPSIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPSIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000140b4.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0��In extracted file (font_06_sfnt_off0002b732.bin)
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0bIn extracted file (font_06_sfnt_off0002b732.bin)

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