MALICIOUS
684
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded Windows executable disguised as a PDF. The JavaScript also contains URLs that suggest credential exfiltration or command execution, as indicated by the 'eval()' call and the decoded behavior 'credential_exfil'. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as a known trojan.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9950
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\i:\tmp\1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
eval('$ans -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENTOptional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.zeustech.net/ In extracted file (i_mp.pdf)
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (i_mp.pdf)
- tcp://77.122.222.199:4444In extracted file (i_mp.pdf)
- http://site.com/calc.phpReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://site.com/calc.php?exp=���In PDF document text
- http://yourdomain.com/mail.phpIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://site.com/calc.php?exp=Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.apache.org/In extracted file (i_mp.pdf)
- http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00001331.icc)
Extracted artifacts 14
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
i_mp.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 1105 at offset 0x69ED8 | 73802 bytes |
SHA-256: 048806cf1d2d78a5c4cd8eca3570f3c14aeded1dfc42c77fc608a6f7ace64135 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=i_mp.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 77.122.222.199:4444 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
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javascript_obj1106_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 1106 at offset 0x74B11 | 55 bytes |
SHA-256: 36234c503681564b610020290c2e8b357fe26b950e425d7601c1ead628ce5124 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "i: mp ", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_071_off0002e2ab.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2E2AB | 491640 bytes |
SHA-256: 68205f1c3f146b062e4d7780106926692ab5301031e80b9afadef65951da24c7 |
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icc_00_off00001331.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1331 | 3144 bytes |
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
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font_00_sfnt_off00038596.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x38596 | 34944 bytes |
SHA-256: 620154d9ecaa5bb181e58f0c608768220111f0f4897857ff3a84812b8b4ef229 |
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font_01_sfnt_off0003cd6c.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3CD6C | 32104 bytes |
SHA-256: 7ab860c1284b19c702d02ff457ae4c68534ac7b7a77a4657841d831a5e7fcc81 |
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font_02_sfnt_off0003f3e3.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3F3E3 | 6144 bytes |
SHA-256: 0b33fcc8c08f482278089f5766e59a5d47d3f2473cf3bc473663d57ebec59e9c |
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font_03_sfnt_off00040742.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x40742 | 44796 bytes |
SHA-256: eac0371e1e47735dcf5c801c56d2ecaef6a04beb808e1f36bae28ee877287589 |
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font_04_sfnt_off00045162.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x45162 | 48880 bytes |
SHA-256: 279ce95d783f25347fdc73885d5c0dca1e2e66aa3450dbee5d5e2e6031f2e02b |
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font_05_sfnt_off0004a59e.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4A59E | 64212 bytes |
SHA-256: 36839aa08cb45fd98ba052814fc4b5ef465d1ee9eca339140fdf6be64404a60b |
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font_06_sfnt_off00051e1e.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x51E1E | 50188 bytes |
SHA-256: 7b807c093e783c829dad69c6ba8d4633ddd07583bd5441119e7142d5f5da17b4 |
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font_07_sfnt_off0005752d.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5752D | 35700 bytes |
SHA-256: fe16804332b9d22da12cb9056f6647823f2b681621eea7b9bdcdfeca7b86d707 |
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font_08_sfnt_off0005a18d.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5A18D | 36744 bytes |
SHA-256: 0da5d833377b25d6d9f12684ea9fccb5a77df46ec895143da554fc762e51f1f0 |
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font_09_sfnt_off0005d2ba.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D2BA | 6032 bytes |
SHA-256: fecdd3e4c12749eab449a48cac1aeab791f1bbd4c11c1d742967d6568729e71b |
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