Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 16

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\obrazec.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
  PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
• JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
  Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
• External URI low PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript

  • http://]hostname[:port]/pathPDF link annotation
  • tcp://192.168.123.175:31337PDF link annotation
  • http://www.monotype.comMonotypePDF link annotation
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#PDF link annotation
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/PDF link annotation
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/PDF link annotation
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/PDF link annotation
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/PDF link annotation
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/PDF link annotation
  • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/PDF link annotation
  • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��PDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.comPDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0��PDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0bPDF link annotation
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyPDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpaPDF link annotation
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0PDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0PDF link annotation
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0PDF link annotation
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlPDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/RPA0PDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0�PDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/CPSPDF link annotation
  • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPSPDF link annotation
  • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0PDF link annotation

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