Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 15

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
  PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7286040-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7286040-0
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
  PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• External URI info PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://GH.II/JK4LL5MM6NN9RR.XX/YY+ZZ Referenced by PDF JavaScript

  • http://ocsp.verisign.com0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.zeustech.net/In PDF document text
  • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/askperf/archive/2011/06/17/demystifying-shims-or-using-the-app-compat-toolkit-to-make-your-old-stuff-work-with-your-new-stuff.aspxPDF link annotation
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2009/02/02/preventing-the-exploitation-of-seh-overwrites-with-sehop.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2009/11/20/sehop-per-process-opt-in-support-in-windows-7.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/srd/archive/2009/06/12/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-1.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/srd/archive/2009/06/12/understanding-dep-as-a-mitigation-technology-part-2.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700805.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://aka.ms/emet41psIn PDF document text
  • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2790907In PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2013/05/08/emet-4-0-s-certificate-trust-feature.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/configmgrteam/In PDF document text
  • http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=213962In PDF document text
  • http://blogs.technet.com/b/askperf/archive/2011/06/17/demystifying-shims-or-using-the-app-compat-toolkit-PDF link annotation
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0ZReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.fonts.comYouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttpReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_symbol.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.apache.org/In PDF document text

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