Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5c723342d6c7a17d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

339.4 KB Created: 2009-01-07 14:44:55 +01:00 Authoring application: UnknownApplication (via GPL Ghostscript 8.61) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 78c0ae622e1c7a96e655d9b167c49df2 SHA-1: 552fb35fc433771d12101a2d7989243cdf2499f3 SHA-256: 5c723342d6c7a17df0317fc43d2319b0c7e150754d885085a457045e77ad8a21
676 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command then attempts to start an embedded executable file named 'metasploit.pdf', which is detected as a Windows executable payload. The embedded artifact is identified as a Metasploit stager, and the overall behavior aligns with exploiting a client execution vulnerability via a malicious attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\metasploit.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Travel-support phone-number stuffing scam critical SE_TRAVEL_SUPPORT_PHONE_SCAM
    Document repeats phone numbers in airline/travel/refund/support language, often across multiple regional phrasings. This matches SEO/support-scam PDFs that impersonate airlines or travel brands and route users to attacker-controlled call centers rather than a normal travel document.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.0.1:4444 In extracted file (metasploit.pdf)
    • http://insecure.orgIn PDF document text
    • http://www.metasploit.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.metasploit.com/In PDF document text
    • http://blog.metasploit.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 15

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
metasploit.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 161 at offset 0x4FC45 37888 bytes
SHA-256: fe2f2153ecf334c4baab10814bcde36b1c73904cca134b628e076766678e1e46
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=metasploit.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.1:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0162_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 162 at offset 0x548DA 59 bytes
SHA-256: 625f58bc61f66d706ff3a0fe546b5ebec57503379e171dba3945ab286fe71b58
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "metasploit", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off00000a2d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xA2D 4536 bytes
SHA-256: 22fa7acf2cdd6e0e21c8aceb5f7df7a194982ee30c45b1ff9f0a15d4bf87faae
font_01_cff_off00001d79.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1D79 4745 bytes
SHA-256: 67a22c9dbafe95e5285cfbd88c06c6da6a65327eeefb50926af075b5e8a3b2d9
font_02_cff_off0000312c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x312C 2070 bytes
SHA-256: 0526dbf6816d9bf603f86c50d505ac55940e1bfc48fd5a74d7e3c3a13d2df783
font_03_cff_off0003f9b5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x3F9B5 13608 bytes
SHA-256: 6b1ad7dcd203d80ea9968f0dba87afac0aef510fbca7daa7ecebe919ea35ecda
font_04_cff_off000423ac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x423AC 4119 bytes
SHA-256: 0993dcfae8bcea690bb0d682f5defef8437883f6f320051acd658207bb1bf242
font_05_cff_off000435cb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x435CB 6106 bytes
SHA-256: 9968142c0ff107e7d9dea26452767b21d30a98d0d8d78bfe89b9adae5b3dbaae
font_06_cff_off0004534b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4534B 9815 bytes
SHA-256: 51fa1b3491c1c247e83658fdd5555a6c0e98be6eb267d1534b29d01abbff6ffb
font_07_cff_off00047821.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x47821 6228 bytes
SHA-256: 936552af427ac1d2a73a7baac3568eeeed87005617540afdb0fe982bce075767
font_08_cff_off00048f49.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x48F49 13012 bytes
SHA-256: 4dce28cc4434780a34c41186a54888a352d1bb72c7c361ba2f05b6ac25b115eb
font_09_cff_off0004b736.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4B736 588 bytes
SHA-256: 5a498e91dcc2bbbb9aec6b475481cb9f32fdf88a78e8fdae42c92234f8285235
font_10_cff_off0004c61f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4C61F 515 bytes
SHA-256: 1e679c85f8b6dcd1875b82ec3ba21cf808dc25ec44c0bf20b6d81a85e71b6641
font_11_cff_off0004c9f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4C9F2 534 bytes
SHA-256: 3d46b70570a452a37df3636b797c8aedf98fdcf490fdb5d5027df8768e59d1d5
font_12_cff_off0004cfed.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4CFED 4370 bytes
SHA-256: 72788fdb2fd74bbc7c3ab8fdc8e561a13f0d20faf0f0f1d6272081a2acc870ce