MALICIOUS
516
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.007 JavaScript
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded executable file disguised as '1.pdf', which is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The embedded executable is likely a secondary payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999
Heuristics 11
-
Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
-
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
-
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
-
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
-
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
-
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
-
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
-
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://http://www.videolan.org/mirror-geo.php?file=vlc/1.0.5/win32/vlc-1.0.5-win32.exe� In PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 5
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
1.pdfb4af9fa650a93d24fe404ab9d4b30d7190616ebe6b59ec486cfb77ba9b9a8a11 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 33 at offset 0x4983 | 37888 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
javascript_obj0034_000.js6a59dd3b366f3db80f454a191b81fd87c67c56e15006b58e6d6da19c8de4eb77 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 34 at offset 0x97E3 | 50 bytes |
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "1", nLaunch: 0 });
|
|||
font_00_sfnt_off00001503.bin51f979b47e732f1ac3ddf5cdef81cf2c7672e61e7dbc492acf0f83ef95609d6b |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1503 | 5784 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00002379.bin216c570970cfb375d8634c26e768ccea5845bc6d6c35e297a239269b4c4cee7c |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2379 | 5476 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off00003101.bin33fab8473cba24967590f4fcaf0b7f4ab8d14acd0cdfa8cd3b7369a9e20b7023 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3101 | 6688 bytes |
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.