Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9de40586b4dd0839…

MALICIOUS

PDF

720.7 KB Created: 2015-02-09 17:43:42 +00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010
MD5: a2f22c8a26361e3883e728e3733884fa SHA-1: fde4bc8d90d9eaa3ac8be3be4898824e6d92694a SHA-256: 9de40586b4dd083999a4d0120b9ea750c95ce43ae4e17531a1f43e1dbd3df797
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical launch action that executes cmd.exe with parameters designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. This payload is disguised as a PDF but is detected as a Windows executable. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7287064-0' further confirms its malicious nature as a dropper. The embedded JavaScript API 'this.exportDataObject' is used in conjunction with the launch action, indicating a sophisticated dropping mechanism.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\interesting-facts.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7287064-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7287064-0
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.bloomsbury-international.com/en/
    • http://www.bloomsbury-international.com/en/courses.html
    • http://www.gettyimages.com��
    • http://www.bloomsbury-international.com/en/courses/english-for-specific-purposes.html
    • http://ns.useplus.org/ldf/xmp/1.0/
    • https://www.facebook.com/bloomsburyinternational
    • https://twitter.com/BloomsburyIntl
    • https://plus.google.com/b/103611162292392072892/+Bloomsbury-international/posts
    • http://www.iec.ch
    • http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://www.gettyimages.com

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
interesting-facts.pdf
8cc500662b4480fa55bfd329c5d96fd9b10d5c301eae8d7937ffc19402830fdc		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 440 at offset 0xA9004 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0441_000.js
6286ec33493f22a414774d6c8a6080048bf19b0204aacb445281f01ebc08bc94		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 441 at offset 0xB3CAE 66 bytes

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