Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95da2b82b4ecc458…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.61 MB Created: 2010-03-03 03:03:29 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office PowerPoint® 2007
MD5: ab44d730f86304712b772c0dbe8c130b SHA-1: 6fff4720dca96d0afa1ede8e0fa3a3cd474bf3a3 SHA-256: 95da2b82b4ecc45806a92a806e456ee58d9cfe9651a90792248b30b1630b9f77
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains JavaScript that leverages a launch action to execute cmd.exe. This command is used to execute a dropped file named 'web.pdf', which is identified as a Windows executable. This indicates a dropper mechanism designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The embedded URL http://www.infonetics.com/ may be related to the payload delivery.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\web.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.infonetics.com/
    • http://www.iec.ch
    • http://www.gartner.com/silentlocalechooser.jsp?locale=wcw

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
web.pdf
8f27f7cc56ca4daf21a97c825d3ff091dfaade42f59916151780f3461eb19270		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 785 at offset 0x1971AC 37888 bytes
javascript_obj0786_000.js
12a78337d9506eac91397f206c6996f00fede726315434a4dfd0a63341d90319		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 786 at offset 0x19BE6F 52 bytes
stream_033_off0004b391.bin
fb629a2591f8844f47403101a81e1cd3a9bca5024ae2dd91191310ec48087889		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x4B391 122067 bytes

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