Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ce131eb1cbf9626…

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.7 KB Created: 2020-07-28 18:26:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 67bdd0e86d270b23c66f9724ddd0102f SHA-1: 3b3d17a48d02ae83e16e8adffd770d8f8eef89f9 SHA-256: 7ce131eb1cbf9626f8cbb73f80f69ac238a8722ff080ffea06f61bb1359fb66d
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains heuristics indicating it's a malicious redirector and part of a link farm, pointing to suspicious URLs like 'ttraff.cc'. It also includes lures for clipboard command execution and password-protected archives, suggesting an attempt to trick the user into running malicious code. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=angular+2+file+upload+multipart%252F+form-+data
    • http://files.dodgecityas.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378990/lofiresefoziwana.pdf
    • http://files.arlingtonmsband.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606087/ddee7.pdf
    • http://files.esthermcohen.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969761/bodikiponakozi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5172/8546/files/sudunorisez.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0165/1101/files/jolonegidinipisisebo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0469/0581/files/zesinopova.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1507/6002/files/debonanutorovimakisavu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/3236/0613/files/12562892817.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3469/8147/files/sufovufalizag.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6955/5356/files/8049436562.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/1557/5464/files/dadijotilobaxuzakuxefora.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5857/7046/files/joxes.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9775/9643/files/zawopipojak.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009c55.bin
6a3b59af38695802ba7bd098dfc70413d0685c37c736e356fe8c63bc98ab3631		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C55 5256 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ae26.bin
a8053ac50347b00d7f2a9226c95c71a45132cb5e8d05dc18102bbba2ddaa7f5d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAE26 10376 bytes

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