Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0eacb13b4987544a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-08-09 10:25:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9819b30bacf3d978d4a45fa624ebd27a SHA-1: e60b94d59981b0379f24958c3500c40e66eecfc3 SHA-256: 0eacb13b4987544a5b369fecbb4f7c18c5703246d15f106ccc108d2548d4ed3a
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, directing users to 'ttraff.cc'. It also exhibits a link farm heuristic, suggesting an attempt to manipulate search engine results or distribute content widely. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same malicious URL and numerous other URLs, many hosted on Shopify, likely as part of the link farm. The presence of heuristics related to clipboard command lures and password-protected archive instructions indicates a multi-stage attack designed to trick the user into executing further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=cp+plus+dvr+password+reset+pdf
    • http://files.ingerlene.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383467/269f45f37f9c5.pdf
    • http://files.endlesslygrateful.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739379/0fc3193822c1be0.pdf
    • http://files.helensofaer.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874385/2524771.pdf
    • http://files.nolimitcombatives.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874361/tadikokufemaf.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5651/2676/files/xelarebulefisenef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2073/0011/files/99541580041.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8833/9361/files/wudamexomax.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5317/7237/files/nj_commercial_drivers_license_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7378/8321/files/87328414395.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1779/6764/files/c_naming_conventions.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/89647405972.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1334/9273/files/gututojefokotabuzuxu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0944/1953/files/tofobavekab.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8447/1719/files/robipogofadakomi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5340/6618/files/selfcare._rr._com_change_password.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000640c.bin
d94776b86bc29c1deafbd4303225ee7b4fef44d54e34816b0503752a5081f333		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x640C 5092 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007580.bin
101ee842e58d4b6eee71e9be8bdc2401da441a874b8b7a7091f8678f3565b50e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7580 10128 bytes

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