Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c795af9aae6b22a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.7 KB Created: 2020-08-14 17:53:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: aa5a0be6943daf52019f20f56d1d41da SHA-1: 0ee0beb1aa24308bbe90de3cdfaab73c959a9de0 SHA-256: 0c795af9aae6b22ad1128a79014fa5bbd6b949a20f6ee6544bced16ae13498bc
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous links to external resources, including a known malicious redirector. It also includes heuristics indicating a lure to execute commands via the clipboard and instructions for handling password-protected archives, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The embedded URLs and the nature of the heuristics point towards a downloader or dropper malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=windows+xp+bootable++iso
    • http://jiluteju.gogaphotographylondon.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776757/xawiwirolubo.pdf
    • http://files.findmyireland.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453214/323924.pdf
    • http://files.bigfootdancestudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874240/2725605.pdf
    • http://diwukobom.cervantesprimary.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384771/demosagoduna-posokuli.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0441/4432/8856/files/tedibalunedelepetowu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0087/9515/files/xowuwelopoka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5143/4652/files/69141974759.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0446/7536/7065/files/how_to_install_twitter_webhooks_to_discord.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6758/0322/files/xonamewesi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8249/7701/files/catholic_rosary_prayers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4957/3784/files/36029855476.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9524/4452/files/jazavikojubonofumomosovol.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9623/5415/files/utilitarianism_examples.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3544/3871/files/31475981747.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5782/4419/files/vanunivavibemepijarurusi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9373/7118/files/wujatikegamasuxufitew.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000917d.bin
dcc8bc5ecc7581f118eab0a81e50c56bc401c356f091eeea63c88bb509baec67		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x917D 5172 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000a33c.bin
28da25cec301cb44357ced2e7508a096c9765854b0285b28d7c26e824fe4166c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA33C 10176 bytes

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