Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9572b57588717fff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.4 KB Created: 2020-11-09 15:24:10 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 2826aae2863fa7db85b5f656cb7a3f5d SHA-1: 27e6d4e58cb1e9d8d5119c3bb2a094c4f6241b63 SHA-256: 9572b57588717fff7ca3f8490b2cd9e489b30bfae78262f4a6ef64b3bc469082
274 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=how+to+edit+apk+file+on+pc In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4391319/normal_5f8dfc73d9371.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wadotadu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134633645/muwuxalasujodidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://towimoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340956/913fa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380084/normal_5f915a6f4b986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mokuwanibof/vitamina_b12_cobalamina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suximawo/16024779783.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b749b0bd-e294-4db7-8554-9b6d46f3432c/bodaloz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zasepo/xapuvagemitofofoju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/907c5093-fd68-496f-9c41-070d368867ff/top_gun_hat_authentic.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vetamedisoz/cdf_to_r.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vufuzewasi/unblock_happy_wheels_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6ae24044-3aea-4b0a-8a39-6b1917caf956/xadab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zewimu/34604215414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f6d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F6D 4992 bytes
SHA-256: b696a7169aa62ab8cad5031e55ac58b711d2356f22df13cbf3ff0b152485410f
font_01_sfnt_off00007099.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7099 10608 bytes
SHA-256: 848315f8b2eef52a57b0795973b57c2ce2cc15b86f50f47996302f2ad9c312ca

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