Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 632395753f85421e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.3 KB Created: 2020-08-19 15:46:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7d739d68afdfa0bbadf888c3dd6cd2e4 SHA-1: 245cce363d329a1cc8526626866996bae8e6a836 SHA-256: 632395753f85421eb04999d998b0c29eb4c15f34dde18290846df9245ab4a1db
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a link to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.com, which is likely used to serve a malicious payload. The document body also contains instructions to copy and paste content, a common lure to trick users into executing commands, potentially for downloading and running a second-stage payload. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=activate+windows+10+cmd
    • http://files.grizzinator.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453006/wugib_gelapogoromime_wolonesaguni.pdf
    • http://files.northstarcamaroclub.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302787/zabaxu.pdf
    • http://files.beaskeys.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775850/087be6.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4181/4693/files/weralomivemexarebok.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/4115/1386/files/quimica_inorganica_atkins_espaol.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3820/2273/files/36405317583.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6118/2617/files/rutolad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5545/6149/files/statistical_analysis_handbook_2020_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5122/0134/files/metezonedazopure.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6587/6379/files/89625915642.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2868/4701/files/bepamadofeli.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9775/9643/files/59917029843.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b84.bin
bb15c1a5ce3d8fd3689c7aea8c022776525d24434f0ed7e023894529a36a16fa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B84 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007d82.bin
d565ff6d62f26a5ef9dedf636efbf925af1c8c25895e413ca0b05af0229e7625		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D82 13708 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000aa03.bin
440d224a38c1ead4ea07e8f4f65647285da1dea7a7f2d4fa5bb4e50be78de494		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAA03 16972 bytes

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