Malware Insights
This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute a command. The embedded JavaScript `this.exportDataObject({ cName: "bitcoin", nLaunch: 0 });` combined with the PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristic confirms that a payload, disguised as 'bitcoin.pdf', is exported and likely executed. The PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD and EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV heuristics indicate the exported payload is a Windows executable, further supported by the ClamAV detection of 'Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7'. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic confirms this is an exploit targeting a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader to achieve command execution.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993
Heuristics 13
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\bitcoin.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LUREDocument requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt
- http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf
- http://www.zeustech.net/
- http://]hostname[:port]/path
- http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
- http://www.apache.org/
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_couriernew.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION
- http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION
Extracted artifacts 8
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
bitcoin.pdffeef7a0f7be75bfff63d6b56a563846975826d48bc8775c2c9c67cf517467a7a |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 71 at offset 0x2D132 | 73802 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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javascript_obj0072_000.js2a420f1df3fbd91e6bae225d02861f198baeed47dbb708ab2d8c92b17f25fd59 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 72 at offset 0x37D9F | 56 bytes |
stream_011_off0000e0be.bin40c0b1724d09ad0b56cc5d52879ede9d805719e0f5262bd81618f06f4c59058f |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE0BE | 38580 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00013aed.bin8201d887c3b927dedab1ea649f116c875fa1111ef1ec5bfa230e1ee22777a18a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13AED | 2232 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off00014439.binc24597e26ae279274a3ae22fcd42db9d28b37114b39cda7b8afb339046b7817f |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14439 | 36020 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off00019a94.bin4e90cdf583a48b3b8b1deb4e525e528d044c0eb734dbc66bdfc264607c924cbd |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19A94 | 60572 bytes |
font_04_sfnt_off000236a1.binca86605d43b9a571de19358caf5a7c953b12269096fc8acc41bdc5807fd52d3d |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x236A1 | 37812 bytes |
font_05_sfnt_off00028f44.bin606daa3077a16a05d9c5ae6e95b6e674c6717a7683d8dc3e201525cbe8199761 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x28F44 | 25632 bytes |
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