Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4f68695285e2f4f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

178.1 KB Created: 2006-03-29 16:18:49 +02:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 1.9.129) First seen: 2012-09-24
MD5: f180966ee524d9f0c1e34116415892bf SHA-1: ec6e93a7fc60097cd3ced113713a81d6f69bd854 SHA-256: d4f68695285e2f4f3c6565d805a0f89b5301787b6893890c9e0b85617fbc3b14
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This cmd.exe then appears to launch an embedded executable file named 'Linux-auf-einem-Blatt.pdf', which was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0. The embedded executable is disguised as a PDF but is identified as a Windows executable by its magic bytes.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Linux-auf-einem-Blatt.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (Linux-auf-einem-Blatt.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004372.bin)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004372.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off00015510.bin)

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Linux-auf-einem-Blatt.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 78 at offset 0x217C1 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 944f793757f7c34bf6446676a2aca49e98346bf94a1c3b2d7675d16425d95a8b
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Linux-auf-einem-Blatt.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0079_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 79 at offset 0x2C40C 70 bytes
SHA-256: 68316c5084e86ddf9261bc241f8e915b09a66c77f6e59a3aec447025fe4f2fe6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Linux-auf-einem-Blatt", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00004372.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4372 40696 bytes
SHA-256: 6a4646f8232372a028ab94f40af80811d6d14f88679fdb0b3262e58f6938131f
font_01_sfnt_off0000a38d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA38D 50244 bytes
SHA-256: 21ec4d524f8c83a7350df2bc0a0dc5bce26f2de721025b30dc6ea408a49d4604
font_02_sfnt_off00012673.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12673 23724 bytes
SHA-256: 4fb5a9d6af33d30551bc3771528566eb7b198485e748a7ca46a20a8749f16f41
font_03_sfnt_off00015510.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15510 31564 bytes
SHA-256: 287e20169969095e216cbf69a9d7c9702c0e591e87d21be739c6d7bb04adbd47
font_04_sfnt_off00019d91.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19D91 31516 bytes
SHA-256: 3391f80dbdc3f578beb48810a7669e39aa5f8ae14fd1e47b0c7d0fea5f0a5e06