Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 67d4ac0f317775f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

298.8 KB Created: 2010-12-28 11:07:54 -02:00 Authoring application: Impress (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2012-12-05
MD5: f6cf0dcc1dc2f98a1ce0736486da517c SHA-1: cd8d7c54127042641fa92b32cbfb92f470e2de07 SHA-256: 67d4ac0f317775f2a87952330ff5ffb7147e00fc0e79396b15ba0c42993c3077
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that exploits CVE-2010-1240 to launch cmd.exe and execute an embedded Windows executable payload named 'Aula2.pdf'. This executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0. The embedded JavaScript's behavior is described as 'credential_exfil', and it references the unknown URL http://www.zeustech.net/.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9976

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Aula2.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (Aula2.pdf)
    • tcp://200.144.154.17:4444In extracted file (Aula2.pdf)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000234c5.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netFontsIn extracted file (font_05_sfnt_off00030571.bin)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off000234c5.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off0002cbf3.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseDejaVuIn extracted file (font_05_sfnt_off00030571.bin)

Extracted artifacts 12

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Aula2.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 120 at offset 0x3FADC 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 40f06077e5f0a940f41a1fec21c082bcb173be11904e3101a543b4d8154fc9ae
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Aula2.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 200.144.154.17:4444 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0121_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 121 at offset 0x4A720 54 bytes
SHA-256: 6573d7ffa798f39db06cfb61fd5dabd23ff3ce76d40ec3f0aa5cc047da20c7b6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Aula2", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off000234c5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x234C5 34108 bytes
SHA-256: 12aea71ecfa87d3f3402804e33612272a461aa4a956d956d8fb9c49abe26ab76
font_01_sfnt_off0002885c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2885C 11324 bytes
SHA-256: 772548046259fffcbce4e5751b8d28c576d5d90560bfbbc64b9f5cf75bed3a6e
font_02_sfnt_off0002a759.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2A759 12236 bytes
SHA-256: bf76d3cb24da7f626de1786ff9ebdda3af5c82a53ff8d545dff1e66e8a625c06
font_03_sfnt_off0002cbf3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2CBF3 20008 bytes
SHA-256: 0783c2c95492645bc36e53cad6631d71ce3b56c8f6fe7c67a71caa3885c4dbd8
font_04_sfnt_off0002f07d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2F07D 7704 bytes
SHA-256: c960b72478768b2a84df9edd25975384a1fd91bce6bba756b0c5e39ed79c39a4
font_05_sfnt_off00030571.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x30571 27008 bytes
SHA-256: 146ce5320253759592580b6cbf64719427c34359f64f38895bd2e4591d857595
font_06_sfnt_off0003393f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3393F 21852 bytes
SHA-256: f75fa7ea4508b579520149fb4333bb782cdf349df4d311e2de1b664bb1835a47
font_07_sfnt_off00035dbd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x35DBD 26804 bytes
SHA-256: 76a2d1fe11ffa695a5ea1acd1111655406a3749fb08fd3364310c9b695b7167d
font_08_sfnt_off0003922d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3922D 2832 bytes
SHA-256: bd2894c70e9b36778f6af9524fa1971779f69815a4a7a2934103fcd395b4d223
font_09_sfnt_off00039bd5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x39BD5 29520 bytes
SHA-256: 4a133d81704ce5d27f57baf7f25680117bb7d3603d870262b3b07908376e6f4c