Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6c2546d24b0b6226…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.8 KB First seen: 2026-05-16
MD5: 302e891de1ab0a704c7b57b09403cbc9 SHA-1: ab22abda14b79b4bf5fde70ebfad096b161e9d37 SHA-256: 6c2546d24b0b6226fac2ac613a88f2bcda6d9c1df6ade2b203c1801a517a8284
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe`. This executable is likely intended to establish a connection to the IP address `192.168.1.150:4444`, as indicated by the embedded URL and the CVE-2010-1240 heuristic. The embedded artifact `test.pdf` is identified as a Windows executable, further confirming the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.1.150:4444 In extracted file (test.pdf)
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00001caf.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0xC346 7168 bytes
SHA-256: 1d76f59690c6819270fc36a242118fb8051b8d41faf55ea620f3f09b296a7f18
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.150:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT, SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, VirtualProtect
javascript_obj0046_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 46 at offset 0xC6F1 53 bytes
SHA-256: b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00001caf.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1CAF 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00005d6d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D6D 1208 bytes
SHA-256: 9185c043c6abd206f64edbd3f5bae3a9d095e723910d55f9c928e02cb526dcdb
font_01_sfnt_off000064f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64F0 20756 bytes
SHA-256: e311753632ae5d2e2fcf96c8775cd5550a33fc9c72f42ed83a06845f2e8351a4
font_02_sfnt_off0000a5d9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA5D9 7816 bytes
SHA-256: eea9f50fad1d6d087e414f9ee5cc406ae67dd287f37db286549aa00c39f1f266

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