Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e50fce15a81b642…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.5 KB Created: 2010-02-04 21:45:28 UTC Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.1) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 0ef3b0836533fde1aa64fe2d0884bff6 SHA-1: 3bcda77924fc500a3d84639651dbc01c0e6eee56 SHA-256: 2e50fce15a81b642a3307e0cc0328c297a02c0c379be4e00a3435c45c79c44c6
476 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The critical heuristic CVE_2010_1240 confirms this, specifically noting a chain involving a launch action, shell parameters, and an embedded executable payload. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload, likely a backdoor or trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\test.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUse In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000012c.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000012c.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x1F36 87552 bytes
SHA-256: bb4ea62f5877802ce4511865d083b0c6c3c688f504f6a7bd17c6c1219fefa359
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_MSF_BIND, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0018_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0x8584 53 bytes
SHA-256: b1a09f919e0f5d1c1d284849c9af93bae6fd1411634dfdc491e126f9cd327f3f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000012c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C 8672 bytes
SHA-256: 4f087a45fd40a8395030c9a53de2b0d77e53343a658746ee2d329fb9cf8b0f2e

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