Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22345971ad8d9c33…

MALICIOUS

PDF

117.8 KB Created: 2010-09-07 21:13:03 +02:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 2.4) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: ec3afab6d57a3f51d437598b5327b270 SHA-1: 4b4fe87dbd3705d3a4e667008eae6949e5693783 SHA-256: 22345971ad8d9c3303c532c67fd7cc6b192b2479469ddbac4a07d290be69e344
624 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded file named 'cv.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable payload detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\cv.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI low PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathPDF link annotation
    • tcp://151.61.144.105:6666PDF link annotation
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUsePDF link annotation
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlPDF link annotation
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netFontsPDF link annotation
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseDejaVuPDF link annotation

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
cv.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 49 at offset 0x12713 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 1b6d06bc9d23cf1549d685a80a7a82d853e13540781ca29896dacf01d5c09938
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=cv.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 151.61.144.105:6666 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0050_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 50 at offset 0x1D301 51 bytes
SHA-256: 3f9cf2bf8148d6812b1d35f217f7dab02eb2ad981d7520208f085a44dbfd60af
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "cv", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00001819.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1819 11864 bytes
SHA-256: d4f43c346f6539fad8a0b5400ba55ef6f950741fc927691f4a1fd51cbe5b0048
font_01_sfnt_off00003af0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3AF0 10004 bytes
SHA-256: 760e3af3475fa620766432f6f31deac92f387ee370fc150f3ca07339c26e7d14
font_02_sfnt_off0000585b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x585B 23436 bytes
SHA-256: e2b3fdc4af5fd1933cb5b9c5cca5a61daa79cf79f1e695c40b083dd52df19964
font_03_sfnt_off00008235.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8235 23060 bytes
SHA-256: bb9c8293750d80806c34bffd118d5179086e9f0adbfe4dd5666f6ba5712381b7
font_04_sfnt_off0000c784.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC784 26916 bytes
SHA-256: 648cbd449830152db5fc62f36200d753d49605b03fb0289832b8a5a82c2cbed3
font_05_sfnt_off0000fcae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCAE 20252 bytes
SHA-256: f0e48748c275b44b183e7e6cb61e9458466e7b551b6c014d49307469ca41ed22

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