Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da55407e45921fa4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.2 KB Created: 2017-11-25 04:27:42 UTC Authoring application: Writer (via LibreOffice 5.4) First seen: 2026-05-03
MD5: 3cff6f2b6f51a5e1f33b16a718fb1236 SHA-1: f92a2c5150bb6684fbf0eb0c9ef8e75569725080 SHA-256: da55407e45921fa44ddbd302f87ade9f367604d27703fe62a6466f692b638922
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'Me.pdf'. This executable is detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7'. The PDF also contains a launch action for 'cmd.exe', indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The embedded JavaScript and launch action strongly suggest an exploit targeting PDF vulnerabilities for initial execution and payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7311580-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7311580-0
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Me.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (Me.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.43.150:4444In extracted file (Me.pdf)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlLicensedIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001137.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netFontsIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00002aa2.bin)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Licensing/LiberationFontLicensehttps://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Licensing/LiberationFontLicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00001137.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseDejaVuIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00002aa2.bin)

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Me.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 36 at offset 0x97F3 73802 bytes
SHA-256: a09ff57bd3abf37c5593f696c0090147c333fa28457121723c4b22bec4942e64
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Me.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.43.150:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0037_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 37 at offset 0x14440 51 bytes
SHA-256: 5b57d88da8d1f8e2fd6da513e3728c29644ed95400196859410520697a204194
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Me", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00001137.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1137 9112 bytes
SHA-256: ce06d394955cc67df38b82f44949d47b159e4e1db164e88a4b71975913041bc0
font_01_sfnt_off00002aa2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2AA2 21892 bytes
SHA-256: fc037ca35ccbfcfdb3d4a3b46f9dd0713b141d92e70502af59411d4d6a7b83f3
font_02_sfnt_off00004f46.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4F46 28748 bytes
SHA-256: b9f6edc4ed1ddea87e57d63181197b63867912d734080ff33c7ea8071481acb5