Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd2adefb92027e81…

MALICIOUS

PDF

62.8 KB Created: 2010-09-15 05:55:03 -05:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: fa9a2a9f3648e147f721feb6d29e3cd7 SHA-1: f676ebfa07f43adc02ab0a08d3fae23cd961b2d2 SHA-256: cd2adefb92027e81bd84e1fd2a57ef77a3562dba49e1f5d7a41af0fecdafa9bd
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded executable payload, disguised as 'dibujo.pdf', which is then likely intended to be executed. The embedded JavaScript explicitly calls `this.exportDataObject({ cName: "dibujo", nLaunch: 0 });`, indicating the intention to drop and potentially launch the embedded file. The extracted URLs suggest potential command and control or download locations.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\dibujo.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.mediafire.com/?r148l1d8d7j3aqr In PDF document text
    • http://www.zeustech.net/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (dibujo.pdf)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000032c.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000032c.bin)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
dibujo.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x4AC7 73802 bytes
SHA-256: af9319fa97e719fa2c2d0fb5ace59ac5f490d773f297e5a488b5dcfa89580cde
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=dibujo.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0018_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0xF70B 55 bytes
SHA-256: 5cdcad5121f311c715a52b6c5fe18ee7599eb3d30586dd6d372aa5a70b0bed26
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "dibujo", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000032c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x32C 22724 bytes
SHA-256: 02b173854ecae91075c2b7ead2dcb8ede91161d8faad63eeac2e161b55374104