Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25d1c0e0ed6c869f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.13 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-17
MD5: 10e5f6450315f57d3242a1939fae0a5a SHA-1: 674a5595edb6bb529d7944c85a7db1e5db135c39 SHA-256: 25d1c0e0ed6c869f491a76e3e28694c2a6bf511a3b8b802a900250d196a926f8
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, indicated by the 'OLE2Link / URL Moniker' heuristic firing. This exploit is used to download a secondary payload from the URL 'http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php'. The embedded PDF also contains JavaScript, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php
    • https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://www.iec.ch
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off00016841.bin
f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes
stream_032_off000465ff.bin
88a875baa8975426f51d8a5a829ab465b1594cef4cac69dfd141593c119da07d
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x465FF 65184 bytes
generic_stage_recovery_000.js
b937906c99dc8fa61e3bc971f3e84bb0cad3eb6f63d7fa68c9ff5dee476bbc31
deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from raw PDF metadata at offset 0x0 262144 bytes
icc_00_off00000123.icc
d9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d
pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x123 536 bytes
icc_01_off000216e7.icc
3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301
pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x216E7 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0003a399.bin
56409bb01382a15dcdfec5717b087d2687d261b9d9d209000fe83cd034b1869e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3A399 80692 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00042790.bin
137d2b4721cc363359ff5e253d188292638de3e85bdd19a01f3c52fda1c76905
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x42790 24020 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0004df96.bin
432aaaa866f22bb1424887ff2cc31e041e7b719c0fd52a3cf080cd138cf9208f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4DF96 33684 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001800.pdf
db8790c5babe1a578dddf4d6311855febb5d5b164b6a65d2ccf27b96356ec493
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1800 1182720 bytes