MALICIOUS
172
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, indicated by the 'OLE2Link / URL Moniker' heuristic firing. This exploit is used to download a secondary payload from the URL 'http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php'. The embedded PDF also contains JavaScript, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector.
Heuristics 6
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OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERYBounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
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VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php
- https://wwww.microsoft.com0
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
- http://www.iec.ch
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
- http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
- http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0
Extracted artifacts 10
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1206 bytes |
stream_001_off00016841.binf48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 | 400552 bytes |
stream_032_off000465ff.bin88a875baa8975426f51d8a5a829ab465b1594cef4cac69dfd141593c119da07d |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x465FF | 65184 bytes |
generic_stage_recovery_000.jsb937906c99dc8fa61e3bc971f3e84bb0cad3eb6f63d7fa68c9ff5dee476bbc31 |
deobfuscated-js | generic stage recovery percent-decode from raw PDF metadata at offset 0x0 | 262144 bytes |
icc_00_off00000123.iccd9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x123 | 536 bytes |
icc_01_off000216e7.icc3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301 |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x216E7 | 3144 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off0003a399.bin56409bb01382a15dcdfec5717b087d2687d261b9d9d209000fe83cd034b1869e |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3A399 | 80692 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00042790.bin137d2b4721cc363359ff5e253d188292638de3e85bdd19a01f3c52fda1c76905 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x42790 | 24020 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off0004df96.bin432aaaa866f22bb1424887ff2cc31e041e7b719c0fd52a3cf080cd138cf9208f |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4DF96 | 33684 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001800.pdfdb8790c5babe1a578dddf4d6311855febb5d5b164b6a65d2ccf27b96356ec493 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1800 | 1182720 bytes |
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