Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25d1c0e0ed6c869f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.13 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-17
MD5: 10e5f6450315f57d3242a1939fae0a5a SHA-1: 674a5595edb6bb529d7944c85a7db1e5db135c39 SHA-256: 25d1c0e0ed6c869f491a76e3e28694c2a6bf511a3b8b802a900250d196a926f8
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, indicated by the 'OLE2Link / URL Moniker' heuristic firing. This exploit is used to download a secondary payload from the URL 'http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php'. The embedded PDF also contains JavaScript, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://015073536757/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.php In document text (OLE body)
    • http://104.238.189.239/httpsworkspace.google.comintlen_insolutionsaiplans_pricing.phpDecoded from obfuscated IP host (015073536757)
    • https://wwww.microsoft.com0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.iec.chIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0lIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0In document text (OLE body)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
stream_001_off00016841.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes
SHA-256: f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532
stream_032_off000465ff.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x465FF 65184 bytes
SHA-256: 88a875baa8975426f51d8a5a829ab465b1594cef4cac69dfd141593c119da07d
icc_00_off00000123.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x123 536 bytes
SHA-256: d9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d
icc_01_off000216e7.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x216E7 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301
font_00_sfnt_off0003a399.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3A399 80692 bytes
SHA-256: 56409bb01382a15dcdfec5717b087d2687d261b9d9d209000fe83cd034b1869e
font_01_sfnt_off00042790.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x42790 24020 bytes
SHA-256: 137d2b4721cc363359ff5e253d188292638de3e85bdd19a01f3c52fda1c76905
font_03_sfnt_off0004df96.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4DF96 33684 bytes
SHA-256: 432aaaa866f22bb1424887ff2cc31e041e7b719c0fd52a3cf080cd138cf9208f
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001800.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1800 1182720 bytes
SHA-256: db8790c5babe1a578dddf4d6311855febb5d5b164b6a65d2ccf27b96356ec493

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