Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2907d74d4bb3ce57…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.48 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-17
MD5: a72e500e5bc3ac3e8232aac814557f0f SHA-1: 9460b58de606d87978a7398031edd1821704f701 SHA-256: 2907d74d4bb3ce573ed471b7ddd96f2c49c9dc2b7c7485940651cd9fc1542080
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious Attachment

The sample is an OLE file containing an embedded PDF document, which is a common delivery mechanism for exploits. The 'OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR' heuristic firing indicates the use of a known exploit vector. The 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic further confirms suspicious findings within the embedded PDF. No VBA macros were found to be executable, suggesting the primary malicious functionality resides within the embedded PDF.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
37786802c3e54f75f20495e65e2ffc4219fc951bb020e3c17baea2638fe165b3		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0015EC88/OLE10natiVE 1602 bytes
stream_001_off00016841.bin
f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes
icc_00_off0004954f.icc
d9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x4954F 536 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00050da5.bin
72d364d80d92a25f33929cd2035bec8826666c5562209ec6d92ccfa47393e8f0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x50DA5 35836 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006d000.pdf
d4b7c495c93c942a5086a7eccd46eab32dc166fdca7ebcf275f7601ae30fb224		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6D000 1101824 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
fa2bf31e1abaf1e5aa8ad281a17279b9b7da37c89f143349ec165c455e6dca11		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1543680 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018600.pdf
b9157479972ea46441e9451e5264f9573fa6641713b635f86356f99d37c6a8d2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18600 1448448 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000a5800.pdf
5c8017734f1bc8a1b1b3dcc99e3726ca4e1387f87479175a03f165f18333726e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xA5800 870400 bytes

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