Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a07a43a6bbc5bdd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

945.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-17
MD5: 3203276aaf175f6f76bba274e41b98e6 SHA-1: ecef93fba2f143ee9be3dc4de313435a3cf03230 SHA-256: 6a07a43a6bbc5bdd4ac435aa08feb6254ac020c6c708adbdd3c526fca24d5171
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OLE2Link file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 to download a remote payload from the URL http://010217725114/cicicicicicicicicicicicicicicici.php?&ɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢ. Additionally, it contains an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://010217725114/cicicicicicicicicicicicicicicici.php?&ɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢ
    • https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off00016841.bin
f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes
icc_00_off0002814f.icc
d9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2814F 536 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0002f9a5.bin
72d364d80d92a25f33929cd2035bec8826666c5562209ec6d92ccfa47393e8f0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2F9A5 35836 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
8ca148490ba4227b8f52976ace2441d79e803e269c9a6561c47f6aef3561e95f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 964096 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018400.pdf
6ad19a71456ff97ced1fbec09d9cfae6998c1069f6ae2fb4d09c930c55b03275		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18400 868864 bytes

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