Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Heuristics 4

• OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
  Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://014013117744/wowoowowowo.php?&ɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢ In document text (OLE body)

  • http://96.44.159.228/wowoowowowo.php?&ɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢɢDecoded from obfuscated IP host (014013117744)
  • https://wwww.microsoft.com0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0lIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0In document text (OLE body)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.