Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 665561b170d89f59…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.35 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-15
MD5: 4120bd7acc38a3c96c333ce04083823c SHA-1: 5018827fb10ec68661649e06e45bc9bcb3a0f680 SHA-256: 665561b170d89f59f7f39f3d6fdbc905a2f59a7d1d069afae8fa18b5c3a20dfb
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This exploit likely delivers a secondary PDF payload, as indicated by the 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic. No VBA macros were found to be executable, suggesting the primary execution path relies on the OLE object vulnerability. The embedded PDF itself contains suspicious static findings, further supporting a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wwww.microsoft.com0
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0Z
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0l
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f5b620cb26e92d5a3ebd8ca8c0d6909c3aa21cffb08ff5c7f2a959e9c1bf95e7		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000C42D7/OLe10NAtive 1482 bytes
stream_001_off00016841.bin
f48ea04ac88d94e996724b0312c89f652abb5998d218f16ccdd544cbb7a84532		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x16841 400552 bytes
icc_00_off0004974f.icc
d9f822e8083f2f4d1c91e887454be5f75e8c7144b2853408f361e3c4a7a6b36d		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x4974F 536 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00050fa5.bin
72d364d80d92a25f33929cd2035bec8826666c5562209ec6d92ccfa47393e8f0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x50FA5 35836 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00055a00.pdf
f1216e3031b621c6d1f7b11c5d13b47b61f345ff6987ce02dbb22008199ef36b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x55A00 1066496 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
f77a2dfce8a20121d752b248573472d1c5abe159a7644182a267e32b449f6bf1		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1412608 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0008e400.pdf
c3b9e6ffb7a33109154a4a12098ef00f2b5b4b5052d14c80051101069142af63		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x8E400 834560 bytes

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