Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e3f8bc0e69c9033…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.2 KB Created: 2006-06-04 09:05:16 UTC Authoring application: QuarkXPress(tm) 6.5 First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 924ebfde13bbfec957d3145973c4b288 SHA-1: 185e4402f847e50c0984fadc8ff0927f51ba6689 SHA-256: 1e3f8bc0e69c90331daaaedeb612bb427f8af18a740f101e8d32ee700f662f38
618 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is used to export an embedded Windows executable payload, disguised as 'AntiStressKit.pdf', which was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0. The embedded executable is the primary payload, and the PDF serves as a dropper and lure. The URL http://www.pdffun.com is also present in the document body and as an external URI.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\AntiStressKit.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pdffun.com PDF link annotation
    • http://www.pdffun.com)/S/URIIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pdffun.com)/H/N/Border[0In PDF document text
    • http://www.zeustech.net/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (AntiStressKit.pdf)
    • tcp://41.145.54.211:5432In extracted file (AntiStressKit.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
AntiStressKit.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 52 at offset 0xA2A1 73802 bytes
SHA-256: e4b1d4a9448b268e58d5ceb641267c2b0c5b93171f85c6a24019662c0e46f306
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=AntiStressKit.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 41.145.54.211:5432 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0053_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 53 at offset 0x14F69 62 bytes
SHA-256: 59db0475fe5c65575af10103a0acc1570d28f6b6787e6211c1731f5eef35d603
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "AntiStressKit", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off00005d81.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x5D81 3868 bytes
SHA-256: 9d09045e49130292766494da77b0810d4bd9b34aaeb44eaa8d63af1fc1f95a59
font_01_cff_off00006ea1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x6EA1 4455 bytes
SHA-256: a6880753f62385685df2d91ca5375702d978c24efc67d580e5e2ed7c61459d7b
font_02_cff_off0000818d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x818D 1759 bytes
SHA-256: 6cf2dd854d320cf0986002d17d7a476909a6d904d0972a352d13ab28bede2689
font_03_cff_off00008a2a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x8A2A 1315 bytes
SHA-256: c7a7851e35a25b5a86e57002eb6c7a805e27ded2fe5df2cde1e8ff4ec99b056f
font_04_cff_off000090c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x90C3 288 bytes
SHA-256: e0b90a566283c9622e772a37420e1ab22aabfd546e51ee0ba3c0622edf411f1b
font_05_cff_off0000934f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x934F 126 bytes
SHA-256: b06b73a243b0b5c32f35923c3533c6c568ac8e4bcc77040eef61b862c7fb3080
font_06_cff_off00009533.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x9533 143 bytes
SHA-256: 1abee577a54fddf63f50c29fedd3b9f587c8a1c7b98c861aed540230ab45a7a8
font_07_cff_off0000972b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x972B 130 bytes
SHA-256: 08e73c47905bee52a74efdc0678e29f7b6f2dd44d3dda8288c4d4c2c054aa74e

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